-Survival Strategies of a Small State-

Dev Raj Dahal, Foreign policy expert, Nepal

The legacy of the fifties and the effects of the acculturation process of leaders of most of the political parties in India will no doubt continue to influence Nepalese foreign policy in the future.

Yet a new set of problems stemming from the forces of global interdependence will also increasingly dominate the Nepalese geopolitical thinking in the years to come.

In fact, the forces of interdependence have not only succeeded in eroding the basic difference between domestic and foreign policies but have also brought the survival of small states like Nepal into a sharp focus perhaps as never before in history.

As the rules of the game of interstate relations have undergone a drastic change in consonance with the tenets of Interdependence, Nepal is also exposing itself to these new stimuli and changes.

Interdependence entails interdependent decision-making, taking into account other countries’ choices and expectations, which means mere exploitation of the regional powers or forging alignment with one power alone can no longer serve as an instrument of successful Nepalese diplomacy.

The conventional system, moreover, creates a certain security dilemma — a dilemma in which each neighbor suspicious of the other’s intention and capability increases its defensive position and military profile in a vicious circle augmenting mutual insecurity and minimizing the prospects for cooperation.

This dilemma shows clearly how the external configuration of power can affect the survival, peace, and development of Nepal, and witty foreign policy is no less important than domestic politics.

The growing poverty in Nepal also makes it potentially vulnerable to internal disorders because it undermines in the long run citizens’ loyalty to the government’s policy and leads to external dependency trap whose solution does not lie in augmenting the military profile.

The power potential of neighbor’s readers Nepalese security through military option neither desirable nor likely.

It is not desirable because of the costs it entails and the strains it puts on the process of nation-building.

If security in general presupposes the notion of protecting the core national values in a world characterized by anarchy, it is also linked to the internal processes of development and national integration, more so in the case of a small and weak state like Nepal which can hardly influence the external geostrategic milieu by its intrinsic capabilities.

The increasing inability of the Nepalese government to satisfy the needs of its people and the role of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and international institutions, too, render security and development interdependent internally and externally.

The new security thinking in today’s geostrategic context, therefore, embodies a trilateral cooperation among the components of civil society including the government, the NGOs, and international institutions.

In an age of common security, the old geopolitical formulas appear simply inadequate to provide a viable option for the intricate problems of survival, peace, and development.

Arun III is a case in point: it shows how international development debate on environment can influence domestic development discourse.

The UML government that came to power after 1994 mid-term elections tried to shift Nepalese foreign policy discernibly from the earlier special relationship with India to what then prime minister Mana Mohan Adhikari and deputy prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal called a balanced relationship between India and China. Their statements reflected three
views: dialogue on review of the treaty of 1950, primacy of national interests in foreign policy matters, and deideologization in foreign relations.

That UML’s China policy remains so far passive may be ascribed to the perceived need to avoid unwanted rift with India as well as the nation’s response to the growing public sensitivity to the changing global political economy caused by its growing dependence.

The most enigmatic questions raised by this situation are: Would the UML sideline the Peace Zone proposal? And, is the direction of change in foreign policy consistent with our national interests?

The first question appears to call for a wait and see answer.

The proposal has often been mooted for a proactivist diplomacy to achieve the nation’s special identity in the comity of nations, but heightened tension and wars of nuclear or conventional nature between India and China and India and Pakistan can easily influence Nepal.

In this sense, the “Peace Zone is a natural product of preventive diplomacy as well as Nepalese commitment to promote peace by supporting nuclear non-proliferation, non-transfer of nuclear materials, non-attack on a non-nuclear state by nuclear powers, and confidence building measures in the regional and international politics.

But with regard to the second question, what can clearly be said is that if Nepal is to broaden its choice of maneuver for survival and prosperity, it must invariably play a very cautious diplomatic game.

At this time of crisis in global nonalignment, there are more challenges rather than opportunities for Nepal to stimulate any radical change in its hitherto foreign policy.

This is why moderation should become the norm to combine the requirements of the global political economy to the national needs for economic statecraft in foreign policy.

HISTORY AS A CONDITIONING FACTOR:

The central notion of history as a conditioning factor of geopolitics consists in learning how Nepal has strongly protected itself.

As the oldest nation state in South Asia, it has its own architecture (Pagoda), culture (syncretic form of Hinduism and Buddhism), dress, and languages.

Nepalese history as a repository of events has also played a critical role in instilling and inculcating its insights and lessons, myths and memories, and values and visions of Nepalese statesmen and commoners alike from generation to generation.

Essentially, the historical time-frame of Nepal can be divided into three distinct phases.

The first one, of course, was the experience of a cluster of ministates under different rulers.

The interstate relations of those ministates are not well documented in the Nepalese historiography. Modern Nepal’s
foreign policy begins only after the unification of Nepal under Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1768 AD out of the nucleus of Gorkha.

But the racial (Aryan and Mongolian), religious (Hinduism and Buddhism), and commercial interactions among these states and their ties with Tibet and the subcontinent during the rules of the Lichhavi, Kirat, and Malla dynasties had some influence in the geopolitical configuration of this state.

The second phase was the experience of the unification of Nepal as a nation-state in the latter half of the eighteenth century under king Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha who ascended the throne in 1742 AD.

After the transfer of capital from Gorkha to Kathmandu, political power was pushed outward through military victory, friendly alliances, and dynastic marriages.

This process was stabilized by Sanskritization, mobilization of people in the face of an emerging imperial threat, establishment of postal services, and societal support to the army — all serving as centripetal forces.

The state was centralized and military prowess commanded a central priority. King Prithvi Narayan Shah fully understood the precarious position of Nepal and described it in his imagery of “a yam between two boulders,” where China was the defender of the status quo while British India was the challenger.

He, therefore, constantly favored a statecraft geared for a self-efficient state capable of sustaining defensive foreign policy. At the same time, he also stressed economic and cultural nationalism — preventing the entry of both the foreign traders and Christian missionaries.

After his death in 1775, the process of unification was carried out by his son Bahadur Shah acting as a regent. Nepal’s strength and will to survive political crisis as an independent state was tested on a number of occasions in the wars and conflicts that followed.

The growing commercial interests of Nepal stimulated Gorkhali attack on Tibet in 1790 ending the state’s self-imposed isolation. Gorkhali victory resulted in the signing of a treaty in June enabling Nepal to station its representative in Lhasa and entitling it to receive fifty-thousand rupees in annual tribute.

Tibet’s decision to comply with the treaty obligations brought up serious rifts.

But the Chinese emperor’s response to Tibet’s appeal for help forced Nepal to seek a treaty with Tibet in 1792 which while retaining Nepal’s privilege in Tibet obliged Nepal to send quinquennial tributary missions to Beijing.

Nepal’s missions to China, however, were occasional, and discontinued in later years, but Tibet’s missions to Nepal continued until 1953.

Nepal’s struggle for survival took a different turn after it signed “commercial” treaties with British India in 1791, which set up its “residency” in Kathmandu in 1801, and was forced to sign the Sugauli Treaty in 1816 following its military defeat in the Anglo-Gurkha war.

Despite the defeat, however, the tenacity with which the Nepalese people carried their struggle forward in the teeth of a powerful British Indian empire evoked even their enemies’ admiration.

That event not only diminished Nepal’s status in foreign policy but also compelled it to cede a large chunk of its territory including Kumaun-Garhwal in the west, part of Tarai in the south, and the territory between Mechi and Teesta rivers in the east.

Since then the boundaries of modern Nepal have been relatively stable with only minor modifications.

The territorial cordon created by British India then emasculated Nepal’s ambition and rendered its national purpose to bare existence in the days to come.

Nepal’s balance of power maneuvers also floundered until king Mahendra came to the throne in the fifties.

Since then, fully conscious of its independent identity, and aware of the limits of that identity, Nepal has tended to define its security on the basis of territorial sovereignty rather than assertive nationalism.

The third phase was the experience of the Rana rule for a century.

Following the advent of Jung Bahadur Rana in a classic putsch in 1846, the phase of hereditary Rana prime minister ship took its start.

Nepal under Jung Bahadur remained a centralized feudatory state friendly to British India in isolation from the rest of the world. Knowing the expanding power of British India and the eclipse of the Chinese empire, he offered help to the British during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and in return received a certain part of the Tarai as a gift, lost in the Anglo-Gurkha war.

Friendship with British India also helped him in his attack on Tibet in 1855 to legitimize Nepal’s special position there.

His successors continued his policy and went ahead to permit Gurkha recruitment in the British Army.

The Gurkhas are still serving in the Royal Palace of Great Britain and its leased territory in Hong Kong.

As a result of this policy, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in December 1923 that recognized Nepal as a sovereign independent state.

Ambassadorial relations between the two countries, however, started only in 1934.

Meanwhile, in the north, Nepal also played a mediatory role in the Sino-Tibetan conflict of 1910 which arose out of the Chinese desire to control Tibet.

Nepal also showed its willingness to resume traditional tributary relations with China.

During the First and the Second World Wars and also the partition of the subcontinent, Gurkha armies were deputed for the creation and maintenance of peace and stability.

After the independence of India in 1947, Indian leaders kept themselves clinging to the imperial policy of the British, and divided the Gurkha Army into British and Indian Gurkhas. This policy seemed essential for the unification of Indian states;
maintenance of the subcontinental security (deployment of Gurkhas in the Indian borders); meeting any external eventuality (involvement of Gurkhas in the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan wars); maintenance of internal law and order involvement of Gurkhas in Assam, Nagaland, Punjab, Ayodhya, etc.); and projection of its power in the neighborhood without outside powers’ involvement (involvement in Sri Lanka’s ethnic affairs).

This explains why in the midst of political change in Nepal in 1950, Nehru adopted the policy of balance in the Delhi Compromise — between the Ranas, King Tribhuvan, and Nepali Congress — reflecting his preference for stability rather than democracy in Nepal.

But as the conflict between the Ranas and the Congress leaders grew, they nullified each other’s efficacy giving the king considerable strength to act independently of them.

But it would be doing injustice to overlook the Ranas’ contribution to Nepalese foreign policy.

Under the Ranas, Nepal was practicing a self-induced form of dependency upon the British imperial system, but the room for diplomatic maneuvers was not completely closed.

The Ranas strenuously tried to broaden Nepal’s diplomatic options after the British withdrawal from the subcontinent. In March 1947 Nepal sent its representative to the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi.

In April Nepal signed a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the United States.

Two years later diplomatic relations were established with Burma and France, and Nepal also sought the United Nations membership which materialized in 1955 after the Soviet withdrawal of its veto.

The Soviet use of veto was the effect of Nepal’s special ties with British India.

The American ambassadorial representation in August 1951 after the collapse of the Rana regime; opening of diplomatic relations with communist China in 1955 (Nepal also participated in the Bangdung conference of nonaligned nations), the Soviet Union in 1956, and Switzerland, Japan, and Germany in 1957; and the flow of economic, technical, and diplomatic support from them provided some options against Nepal’s hyper-dependence on India.

Prime Minister T. P. Acharya’s foreign policy (January 1956) marked the beginning of the end of the British-Indian mode of Nepalese role in isolating China and symbolized Nepal as a link between India and China.

This policy was an antidote to the Indian efforts to coordinate Nepal’s foreign and defense policy evolved in 1954 through the Aid Memoire prepared by Nehru.

Acharya’s successor K. I. Singh, in 1957, however, threw cold water on this conception until it was further revived by B.P. Koirala by projecting the nation’s nonaligned image.

It was this image that would later bring up substantial dividends from the major countries of the world partially removing the inconsistency between Nepal’s role in the subcontinental defense and its pursuit of nonalignment between the regional and global powers.

A close parallel does thus exist between Acharya’s and Prime Minister B.P. Koirala’s (1959-60) foreign policy conceptions and operations as both avoided a “joint defense system” with India thereby declining to share the Nehruvian notion of “China as a threat to Nepal.” Neither of the two perceived any threat from China nor ignored the political implications of such perception.

Doing otherwise could limit the nation’s choice in internal (autonomy) and external (sovereignty) matters.

Both the leaders knew the political forces of their age; however, both adopted different means.

Owing to the linkage with the Socialist International. B.P.’s foreign policy conception, not unlike the Ranas’, was more predisposed toward the West than China while Acharya inclined more toward China than the West.

In that process, the two leaders laid the groundwork on which king Mahendra’s foreign policy of diversification was realized. King Mahendra, however, differed sharply from B.P: the latter had consciousness mostly of his party, the NC, rather than the opposition political force; while the former took an account of the unity of opposites.

B.P.’s inability to anticipate correctly the relative strength of opposing political forces made him the victim of his aspirations. But there was commonality, too, as foreign policymaking process under both remained personalized and centralized.

LESSONS OF HISTORY:

Is a historically rooted geopolitics-based security framework relevant for the future?

The lessons of history can be applied only if the problems faced in the past have continuity and strategies used historically yield meaningful payoffs.

Other things being equal, the shadow of the future portends that the change in the neighbors’ power potential would eventually produce a new correlation of forces and substantially different possibilities.

It is far from clear whether such a correlation would evolve peacefully, competitively, or conflictually.

However, it unfolds, Nepalese have to define their ties with the neighbors in positive terms so that their stand will be credible and acceptable in the long run remembering that Nepalese history as a vital spirit of national psychology is a remarkable model of perennial resistance and survival within any situation, no matter how terrible.

This is also how it has retained its identity.

History offers a number of lessons for the future.

First, Nepal’s survival and identity can be ensured by a correct policy rather than ideology. Second, Nepalese foreign policy strategies have been changing with the corresponding change in the vital decision-making circumstances.

This has become possible through flexibility in policy posture. Several conceptual innovations such as isolation, neutrality, equidistance, special relationship, and equiproximity explain this.

The operation of these concepts cannot be labelled good or bad by judging from today’s standard because they emerged as historical needs, and may reemerge as a possibility in the future.

Third, the concept of geopolitics is itself in transition today which means Nepal must evolve new strategies for its survival and development.

Fourth, for Nepal regional bipolarity is more important than global uni- or multi-polarity in shaping its policy position although this bipolarity is itself “being influenced by the global system.

Finally, the critical element of history is continuity which operates on the basis of necessity.

Conceptual changes in Nepalese foreign policy do also explain why in the course of its evolution Nepal has never become a prisoner of its own history, and how it prevented history from frequently repeating itself.

Because of interdependence, Nepalese foreign policy must be based more on national and regional consensus, explicit and implicit, by taking the national interests into account.

As the forces of interdependence have undermined the nation’s old buffer status, the same must underline its internal viability for survival and progress.

The globalization of political economy has led Nepal to focus primarily on geo-economics, rather than geopolitics, to enhance the scope of political independence through economic interdependence.

It is so because economics has become a “connecting link” between domestic politics and foreign policy.

To promote economic interdependence, however, it must nourish the level, intensity, and ability of its interacting units internally and the degree of interaction with foreign countries offering a certain comparative advantage.

Inequality of power and capabilities between Nepal and its neighbors has induced it to modify the structure of asymmetric interdependence through functional efficacies.

In the context of mutual dependency, sovereignty cannot become an absolute concept.

This means that as a small state Nepal must also take into account to what extent interdependence entails invulnerability and freedom of choice.

Conceptual creativity, rather than indifference, is thus the need of the day.

Smallness by itself is not an obstacle to viability and survival.

Nepalese history is a testimony to this fact. But unless there is a correct policy, neither diversification, nor development, nor even genuine independence is possible.

# Text courtesy: “The Political Economy of Small States” edited by Ananda Aditya for Nepal Foundation for Advanced Studies, (NEFAS) second edition 2001.
# Thanks the NEFAS and the distinguished author Dev Raj Dahal: Upadhyaya.
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