“Nepalese Intelligence community badly needs to have inter-agency synergy, cooperation and coordination in their work. Nepal is bogged down with reactive intelligence that is not intelligence work in a real sense. Nepal had failed several times warning and strategic intelligence in the armed conflict of 1996-2006. It had failed in a plane hijack in 1999 and Terai movement in 2008. It does not have any concrete intelligence on the proliferation of Madrasa, Churches and other ethno groups who have burned the national flag and the federal constitution”.
-Excerpt from the article and Continued from previous issue-
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Rabi R. Thapa
Former Additional Inspector General
Nepal Armed Police Force,
Kathmandu
Process of Intelligence:
All collected information needs to go through a process of intelligence cycle which is also known as the intelligence cycle. Intelligence cycle is a process of collecting information and development of raw information into a processed and finalized intelligence for the use of decision makers and policy formulators who are known as Intelligence Customers. The steps in the process are direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, and dissemination of the final product.
Intelligence Collection Process:
IC products can either be based on a single type of collection or “all-source” intelligence – based upon all available collections. IC products can be produced by one IC element or other IC coordinated elements. Then only they can be delivered to IC customers in various forms – papers, digital media, briefings, maps, graphics, videos, and other.
Intelligence Analysis:
Intelligence analysis work is a very important task often mired in the minutiae of their specific accounts – regions, countries, or issues- and frequently given little or no attention at all.
The Utility of Intelligence:
If the collected and processed intelligence is not adequately utilized, treated and responded to by its customers; it can demoralize, de-motivate intelligence officers. It is also an obligation for the intelligence community to feed credible and qualitative intelligence. For this purpose, an adequate time-frame, man-power and resources, training and technology are important factors that the intelligence customer (the government) needs to cater for.
Customers of the Intelligence Community:
If there is no real customer of intelligence – there is no value of intelligence. Then, who are the real customers of intelligence product of Nepal? The problem of intelligence feeding is also problematic. Sometimes, multiple agencies feed the same information to the same customers differently according to the desire and demand of the customer. This is the dilemma of the intelligence community of Nepal. Sometimes intelligence customers assign one task to numerous agents or agencies; manipulates intelligence and takes decisions that suit his personal interest than that of the institution. In the recent year, magical thinking of Nepalese political leaders has totally defeated the need, use and credibility of the intelligence community in Nepal without any fault of the intelligence community.
Secrecy of Intelligence and Secret Intelligence:
And intelligence that is not secret is no intelligence. Secret intelligence is made by open information scattered all around.
Secret intelligence conjures up different images in people’s minds, occupying the world of fantasy, spy novels. Some see secret intelligence for deceptive, nefarious acts like overthrowing governments and conducting political assassination (Turner, 2006, p.2). Absence of any authorized, competent responsible intelligence community tends to distort the profession and credibility of Nepalese intelligence community.
COMMON CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE:
Strategic and Tactical Intelligence:
Intelligence officer needs to understand the distinction between strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence. Strategic warning is termed as a warning of changes in the character of the threat while tactical warning of specific event.
(Turner 2006, p.2). Strategic intelligence involves assimilating a variety of information—including knowledge of political, diplomatic, economic, and security developments—to create a deep understanding of issues of enduring importance.
Strategic Warning Intelligence:
George Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency opines that “The role of (US) intelligence is to provide warnings about changes in the character of the threats well in advance of a specific incident, not predict the specific incident itself (Davis, 2003).
Strategic warning intelligence provides in-depth assessments of trends and developments that recognizes and warns on issues that can affect the future strategic environment of a nation. The Government of India’s inauguration of the road to Lipulekh is a burning example of failed warning intelligence of Nepalese Intelligence Community. The construction of 75 kilometer of road started in 2008 was noticed by the Government of Nepal only after the Defense Minister of India (The Kathmandu Post, May 8, 2020). Another example of Strategic Warning Intelligence failure is the deadly bomb-blast on April, 2019 in Sri-Lanka. The perpetrator radical group known as National Thowheed Jamath was identified to be behind the attack (bbc.com, Oct. 1, 2020). Warning Intelligence includes transnational issues such as terrorism and transnational organized crime. Whatever may be the case; warning intelligence cannot be always possible and that may not be always accurate.
Anticipatory Intelligence:
Anticipatory Intelligence is somehow similar to the warning intelligence. The goal of anticipatory intelligence is to Identify and assess new, emerging trends, changing conditions, and underappreciated developments to challenge long-standing assumptions, encourage new perspectives, identify new opportunities, and provide warning of threats to the national interests.
Anticipatory intelligence looks to the future as foresight (identifying emerging issues), forecasting (developing potential scenarios), or warning. Anticipatory intelligence assesses risk, intelligence gaps, and uncertainties by evaluating the probability of occurrence and potential effects of a given development on national security.
CHALLENGES OF INTELLIGENCE:
Politicization of Intelligence:
Sometimes, intelligence officers find themselves torn between political bosses – decision makers, policy formulators and implementing field officers. Awkward relationships arise when the information becomes susceptible to politicization among the decision makers – policy formulators – intelligence feeders in Nepal get highly susceptible to politicization of intelligence. This is the main dilemma of intelligence management in Nepal. In Nepal, political leaders are prone to exert excessive pressure on intelligence analysts to toe the political line that distort and vilify the neutrality of the whole intelligence community.
Principles of Uncertainty in Intelligence:
The danger in every organization, especially one built around hierarchy, is that you create an environment that cuts off dissenting views and discourage honest feedback. That can quickly lead to a culture of delusion and deception”. (Comey, 2018, p. 53).When the governments hold subjective control of the intelligence officers or if the consumers of intelligence are wrong, they can be dangerous to the organizations and people they lead.
In some cases, they are a danger to the nation and to the world (Comey 2018, p. x). Uncertainty of the utilization of intelligence demoralizes and de-motivates intelligence personnel. It can have a direct impact on their willingness to take risk and capability of doing so. Reducing uncertainty may look simple; but in practice, it can be very complex. There are certain factors that turn a good intelligence work a failure due to several reasons which makes intelligence work – a game of uncertainty. Some of the eminent factors are explained below.
Intelligence Ethos:
‘Intelligence Ethos’ is a series of cultural principles that are specific to a highly sensitive and shadowy world of intelligence. (Turner, 2006, p. 41.). One of the most important factors of the Intelligence Community to enhance its credibility that can be done only if the Intelligence Community can hold tight to its Ethos. Fundamentally Intelligence Ethos comprises of eight principles.
Mission Specific Myopic\Intelligence agencies want to ensure their own survival first. They seek to maximize the value of their information, increase stature, promote their bureaucratic interests; survive well in the political marketplace. This applies fully to all civil service sectors especially in the intelligence community of Nepal.
Intelligence Exceptionalism:
The Intelligence personnel think themselves “exceptional”. This notion can be seen amongst the elected leaders, foreign and finance ministerial and security personnel in Nepal.
A “Can Do” Attitude:
Intelligence officials need to have absolute faith in themselves which is known as the “can do” attitude. It demands risk taking attitude and behavior. Nepali intelligence personnel are a mixed bag of unprofessional risk-takers and professional escapees due to social political violability. A good and balanced work demands imagination, daring, and persistence from Intelligence officers.
When the intelligence personnel get undue pressure, fear of prosecution and penalty for being loyal to their job, they breed an attitude of – “Cannot Do”, “Let Others Do” or “Will Do It Later”. This is called the “risk aversion culture” of the intelligence community that strongly believes in – “Big Operations – Big Problems; Small Operations – Small Problems; No Operations – No Problems”. (Turner, 2006, p.44).
Ambiguous Mandate:
Ambiguous instruction, order, surrounding and mandate can promote “Risk Aversion Culture” among the intelligence community professional. In Nepal, the majority of political leaders and decision makers cannot tolerate highly professional, strong and successful and centralized intelligence apparatus that dare to challenge bureaucratic and political hegemony (CDOs and Ministers in particular). When the decision makers adopt ambiguity, it creates confusion and weakens the intelligence community’s professionalism and performance adversely.
Politicians and corrupt bureaucrats also prefer to see the intelligence community compete each other in turf battles, and divided loyalties which creates physical and psychological trauma, tortures and insecurity, resignation and dissertation and even suicide. This is the greatest problem of the intelligence community of Nepal.
Competitive Intelligence:
When each competing agency adopts a competitive stance, they tend to undermine the activities of other agencies, seeking more favor from ambiguous decision makers and policy formulators. The unhealthy competition among Nepal Police – Armed Police Force, Nepal – National Investigation Department- Custom Department – Immigration and others are the burning example of this assertion. Such tendency kills the most vital and important component of the Intelligence Community, i.e. inter-agency cooperation and coordination.
Flexible Accountability:
Incompetent and unprofessional intelligence agencies try to escape, shift their burden and blames; avert oversight supervision by the civic society, ombudsman, court and even the executive bodies. When the consumers of intelligence disregard or disrespect processed intelligence, the intelligence community personnel reciprocate by side-tracking government directions. This situation prevails when the government appeases to undue, improper, nefarious pressure groups.
When the oversight shows indecisiveness, weakness or starts doing micro-management of intelligence work, it fosters flexible accountability ultimately diminishes intelligence community to the lowest level. (Turner 2006. p.47).
Strict Supervision of Intelligence from Policy:
Intelligence analysts contribute to the policy process by providing “accountable” intelligence”. (Lowenthal 2000). Intelligence ethos demands separation between the intelligence and policy making body. Intelligence analysts need to present intelligence data without any bias or political taint. Failing to do so fails the objectivity of intelligence.
(Lowenthal 2000).
Strict Separateness of Intelligence from Law Enforcement:
Generally, intelligence agencies are not supposed to indulge in law enforcement duties, the military force is not supposed to do police duty. The Posse Comitatus Act of the US –prohibits any police activities by the military. Similarly, the U.S. Intelligence community is banned from law enforcement jobs for several reasons. They fear combining these two powers may give rise to a “GESTAPO” or “KGB” type of intelligence-cum-police hybrid and may trample freedom and liberties of the people. The other valid reason is that intelligence and law enforcement missions are completely different and require different results and they have procedural differences too.
Who will guard the Guardian?
The Intelligence Community is supposed to be the guardian of the people and their safety and security from internal and external threats. But if they are busy spying over their own people, support the oppressive government; then who is going to protect the people from them? Such actions taken by the government over its own populations; civil right leaders, intellectuals, elite and dissidents are coined as the “Dirty Tricks” of the government. This term was first used in America during the Vietnam War. Then the US Government had to amend its Intelligence Authorization Act, called the Hughes-Ryan Amendment Act in 1974(NCJRS). Subsequently, a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI, Sept.
21, 2020) was established in 1977 to monitor and check the overbearing attitude of the intelligence community and especially the CIA. Consequently, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) was formed in 1978. The Congress had passed the Intelligence Oversight Act in 1980 (Intelligence Oversight Act 1980). This Act provisioned for Congress approval of any covert action by the CIA. Despite these restrictions, Congressional and executive oversight could not save America from getting into infamous scams like Contra-war in Nicaragua and Iran-Contra Affairs in the 1980s. (Iran Contra Affairs 1980)
Conclusion:
American and European people are far more familiar with their intelligence community than we Asians in Nepal and other Asian countries. This communication gap has created suspicion and misunderstandings among the people and the government of Nepal. Americans are knowledgeable and well informed about the role of the CIA, Britons know about their MI5 and MI6, so do the Indians of their RAW and other Intelligence communities. Their citizens know and have confidence in their intelligence community and their capability to safe-guard and protect the sovereignty and national vital interest of their respective country.
On the other side, people of autocratic and nondemocratic countries feel scared and intimidated by their own intelligence communities. People of North Korea, Ukraine, Poland (Fida, 2020) and Hungary (Roger 2018), and even Russia feel intimidated and insecure by their own national intelligence community. Recently, the poison case of Alaxei Navalny, the opposition leader of Russia is one for example (bbc, September 18, 2020).
The strategic environment is changing rapidly all over the world. The world is facing an increasingly complex and uncertain world due to international terrorists, migration, human-drugs-weapons trafficking to trans-national organized crimes- that has become more dangerous, complex and complicated due to the globalized world. At the present circumstances, Nepal has become more vulnerable due to changing environment and geo-political competition, conflict and revelry between USA, Europe India versus China. Concurrently, Nepal seems to have failed badly to deal with such complex and uncertain circumstances.
The question is – do the Nepalese people fear or appreciate their intelligence community? Why Nepalese are so skeptical and unfriendly if not hostile to the Nepalese security and intelligence community? There is a fear of the unknown that the government must take seriously if the post 2008 secular, federal republic of Nepal wants peace, harmony and a stable government.
Nepalese Intelligence community badly needs to have inter-agency synergy, cooperation and coordination in their work. Nepal is bogged down with reactive intelligence that is not intelligence work in a real sense. Nepal had failed several times warning and strategic intelligence in the armed conflict of 1996-2006. It had failed in a plane hijack in 1999 and Terai movement in 2008. It does not have any concrete intelligence on the proliferation of Madrasa, Churches and other ethno groups who have burned the national flag and the federal constitution.
Human memories are short, institutional memory is poor in Nepalese intelligence community.
However, as a matter of fact, it must be remembered that intelligence is irrelevant without policy, while policy will be blind without intelligence. At the same time, policy makers cannot (and should not) expect intelligence analysts to advocate policy, or be a “team player” in policy circles.
End text.
# the distinguished author Shri Rabi Raj Thapa could be reached at: thapa.rabiraj@gmail.com
References:
1 The Author is the Former Additional Inspector General and Academic Program Coordinator (2015-2019) of APF, Nepal
2 Stephen Dedijer (2000) Intelligence and National Security at the Beginning of the 21st Century (PDF)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281408348_Intelligence_and_National_Security_at_the_Beginning_of_the_21st_Century, Accessed Date: September 18, 2020.
3 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2019, Vision of the Intelligence Community;
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf. Accessed date: September
18, 2020.
4 Ibid.
5 (Ibid).
6 ODNI – The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, visit sites – https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-
Are/organizations https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do. Accessed date: September 18, 2020.
7 CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), https://www.cia.gov/about-cia. Accessed date: September 18, 2020.
8 National Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-
Security/about. Accessed date: September 18, 2020).
9 Departments/Ministries – HMGN, National Investigation Department of Nepal, March 15, 2020. Accessed Date – October 15,
2020. http://nepalhomepage.com/vacancy-notice-by-national-investigation-department/
10 The Constitution of Nepal
11 National intelligence machinery: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-intelligence-machinery
12 Turner A. Michael (2006), “Why Secret Intelligence Fails”, Manas Publications, New-Delhi, India
13 Davis Jack, “Strategic Warning:If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?”. Kent Center Occasional Papers 2. No.1
(January 2003):2
14 The Kathmandu Post, May 8, 2020, India opening a road via Lipulekh, a territory that Nepal claims, is a diplomatic failure,
https://kathmandupost.com/national/2020/05/08/india-opening-a-road-via-lipulekh-a-territory-that-nepal-claims-is-a-diplomatic-
Failure,
15 BBC News Sri Lanka attacks: Death toll soars to 290 after bombings hit churches and hotels,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48008073 accessed Date: October 1, 2020
16 Comey James, (2018), “A Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies and Leadership”. Flatiron Books, New York.
17 Lowenthal, Mark M., and Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington DC. Congressional Quarterly, 2000.
18 NCJRS: National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS,),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=144357
19 SSCI: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence – Responsibilities and Activities
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about. Accessed: Date September 21, 2020
20 HPSCI See: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; https://www.govtrack.us/congress/committees/HLIG
21 Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, (96th Congress) at – https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/s2284
22 Iran Contra Affairs 1980: See Iran Contra Affairs; https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/iran-contra-affair
23 Ghitis Fida, “Is Poland Becoming the European Capital of Xenophobia?” World Political review, November 16, 2017.
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/23625/is-poland-becoming-the-european-capital-of-xenophobia, accessed on
September 19, 2020
24 Roger, Cohen, How Democracy Became the Enemy, The New York Times, (Opinion) April 6, 2020. Accessed Date
September, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/opinion/sunday/orban-hungary-kaczynski-poland.html
25 BBC News: Alexei Navalny: Russia opposition leader poisoned with Novichok – Germany, September 2. 2020, accessed date:
September 18, 2020).
26 BBC News. Arrest in Kashmir in India IC 814 hijack case, Published September 13, 2012. Accessed Date – October 15, 2020.
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