Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Naazer,
Assistant Professor, Department of Politics & International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan
Post Doc Research Fellow,
Department of Global Studies,
University of North Carolina, Wilmington.
3.2 India’s Support to Armed Rebels against Panchayat System in 1960s:
The democratic experiment caused political instability and thus was short lived. It also provided India yet another opportunity to interfere and support rebels in Nepal.
In 1960, king Mahendra assumed the executive authority after a ‘palace coupe,’ suspended the constitution, banned political parties and established his direct rule under panchayat system that provided for an indirectly elected national legislature.
He also imprisoned political leaders including the pro-India prime minister B. P. Koirala, the leader of NC.
In response, the ‘rebels’ mainly from NC started an armed movement against the government which continued for several years.
India not only criticized the king on his anti–democratic action, but also provided the rebels covert support, including the permission to use its soil for directing their terrorist acts against Nepal.
Indian support to the rebels continued until Indo-China war of 1962 when New Delhi had to withdraw it fearing that it could further antagonize Nepal and push it further into Chinese camp.
Earlier, king Mahendra had started diversifying country’s relations and building ties with other countries including Pakistan and China. He signed with China an agreement for construction of Kathmandu-Kodari road connecting Nepalese capital to Chinese border in latter’s Tibetan region, which India perceived detrimental to its security.
In 1961, the king paid a visit to Pakistan, first ever by any of its monarch to the country, and then to China where he signed the road agreement.
He also looked towards China for security needs of his country which alarmed India whose territory was being used as a sanctuary by Nepalese anti-royalists’ elements.
The anti–regime Nepalese based in India launched a violent campaign against Kathmandu in late 1961.
New Delhi supported the rebels to force change Nepalese policy.
It however, further worsened bilateral ties of both countries that by then reflected a ‘cold war like situation.’
At the moment, both Nepal and India were playing their cards to pressure each other.
As recorded by a commentator, ‘The more the King used China to pressurise [sic.] India, the more India used the rebels to pressurise the King.’
In order to mount further pressure on Nepal, and force the king for a compromise India imposed an undeclared economic blockade on Kathmandu by the end of September 1962.
The king was, however, relieved because of outbreak of Sino-India war next month.
It was a clear manifestation of power politics on the part of India, Nepalese political forces and the king as they strove to pursue their divergent objectives:
Nepalese political forces mainly NC endeavored to get Indian support against the Monarch; India wanted to exclude Chinese influence in Nepal; while king sought to counterbalance Indian influence through building and strengthening ties with Beijing.
However, India could not sustain it too long and Nepalese political groups were made scapegoat because of strategic reasons.
India had to change its policy towards Nepal after its defeat at the hands of China in 1962 war.
It realized the strategic importance of Nepal and strived to mend the ties.
Thus, Nepal was able to successfully use its ‘turn to China’ card in order to get an assurance from New Delhi that it would no longer support anti-government Nepalese elements.
This weakened the anti-government movement and helped improve bilateral ties of both countries, though Nepalese concerns were not allayed completely.
New Delhi offered Nepal ‘a rapprochement based on acceptance and support of the royal regime’ which Kathmandu accepted, agreeing that it would not allow China to use its soil against vital Indian interests.
India apparently strived to accommodate Nepalese concerns after which both countries agreed on some ‘ground rules … for a mutually beneficial coexistence.’
Still anti–government Nepalese could live in India, though they were not allowed to carry out any significant ‘antiroyalist activity’ on Indian territory.
Without Indian support, the rebels could not sustain themselves in the backdrop of mounting pressure from the royal forces which helped the monarch to rule for a period of over two decades.
In turn, however, Nepal had to concede significant concessions to India in a secret arms supply agreement.
In 1965, India concluded a secret treaty, i.e. Arms Assistance Agreement, with Nepal which further restricted Kathmandu’s independence with regard to purchase of weapons from foreign countries.
It stipulated that only India would meet entire defense needs of Nepal which would get military assistance from the foreign countries such as the US or Britain only when New Delhi would not be in a position to provide the required equipment.
By virtue of this treaty, Nepal was made wholly dependent on India for its defense needs.
The agreement, however, gave a ‘reprieve’ to the king to rule uninterruptedly and the panchayat system to sustain for more than two decades.
Thus, in this case Nepalese rulers got assurance of their survival while India gained its objective to perpetuate dominance on smaller neighbour.
Indian inclination to impose unequal treaties on Nepal by exploiting the weaknesses of its crumbling rulers in Kathmandu generally soured their bilateral ties in the times to come.
For instance, the pattern of imbalanced trade structure between both countries has its roots in Indo–Nepalese Treaty of Trade and Commerce signed in 1950, and Treaty of Trade and Transit concluded in 1960, the latter sought ultimately to create a common market.
Both of these treaties made Nepal economically dependent on India.
The issues surrounding around decades old bilateral treaties related to security and economic ties of both countries resurfaced in 1980s and provided India yet another excuse to interfere in Nepalese affairs.
India’s Role in Downfall of Panchayat System in 1990:
India again interfered in Nepalese affairs and its role was pivotal in giving ‘decisive blow’ to the panchayat system and restoration of democracy by 1990.
In 1985, NC started a massive protest movement against the panchayat system.
New Delhi extended its full support to anti–regime movement in Nepal.
In 1989, India imposed a blockade on Nepal by closing 19 out of 21 trade and 13 out of 15 transit routes being used by the latter which gave a ‘decisive blow’ to the panchayat system.
The trade embargo was lifted in June 1990 after change of governments both in Kathmandu and New Delhi.
Meanwhile, the Nepalese king was forced to give up his stance and to accept the demand of restoration of multiparty democratic system in April 1990.
India’s decision to impose embargo on Kathmandu was caused by its annoyance over Nepal’s assertion of its political independence and pursuance of its foreign and defense policies devoid of Indian control in late 1980s.
Several Nepalese decisions had made India furious: an arms purchase from China; imposition of work permit system for Indian citizens working in Nepal; differences between Kathmandu and New Delhi over interpretation and validity of 1950 and 1965 treaties, including the ones on common defense which Nepal denied and insisted on its neutrality and non-alignment; and, finally its demand for revision of 1950 treaty.
They also differed over several issues related to trade, transit and especially giving each other preferential status.
However, the main cause of Indian concern was Nepalese import of Chinese arms, including anti-aircraft weapons, in June 1988.
New Delhi interpreted it as a signal of Nepal viewing India as a ‘hostile neighbor.’
It also regarded it as a violation of 1965 agreement.
Reportedly, Nepalese moves had angered New Delhi to the extent that it viewed ‘personalized power structure’ as unpredictable and unreliable and preferred a democratic system wherein it could create lobbies for and against any policy.
Thus, government and several political parties in India put their entire weight behind the forces demanding restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal.
India strove to impose yet another unequal treaty on the debilitated Nepalese king in the backdrop of mounting pressure by democratic elements backed by New Delhi.
India had diverse, complex and incongruous objectives behind its support for pro-democracy movement in India.
Apparently, India publically supported the movement due to its ostensible commitment to human rights, freedoms and democracy.
But actually, it was just, in the words of a Nepali scholar, ‘an idealistic veil intended to cover its true intentions, which were focused on securing another crucial agreement with Nepal.’
India presented yet another Nepalese government under crises a draft treaty on 31 March 1989, that if accepted by Kathmandu would have, in the words of then prime minister of Nepal, deprived it of its sovereignty completely.
However, king Birendra Bir Bikram Shah declined to ‘surrender the country’s sovereignty’ to India and instead preferred to ‘give in’ to the rising mass demand for restoration of democracy.
The provisions of the proposed treaty intended: to forbid Nepal to enter into any military alliance with any other state or organization without prior consultation and agreement with India; to oblige Nepal to consult in advance with India when importing arms, training armed personnel, and raising additional military units; to give India or its nationals first preference in Nepalese development and industrial projects whenever Nepal sought foreign assistance for such purpose; and, to ensure India’s preferential involvement in exploiting water resources for their shared rivers.
However, salaciousness on the part of Nepalese king foiled Indian intentions.
The entire episode was a reflection of a power politics between different actors operating at multiple levels.
Nepalese political parties pressurized the king to further their political interests and also sought Indian help to this end.
New Delhi used the opportunity to show its displeasure over and force change Nepalese policy of coming closer to China aimed at decreasing Kathmandu’s dependence on New Delhi.
Indian blockade was, in fact, a signal from New Delhi that it was not ready to tolerate Nepalese efforts to get freedom form Indian control.
Thus, it used coercive diplomacy to keep Kathmandu under its control. Nepalese political parties in their quest for power were aligned with New Delhi that gave the latter a leverage to put pressure on the king.
The drama ended with a victory for Nepalese political parties who were able to extract concessions from the king which he otherwise, would have not been willing to concede.
In this case, the king conceded concessions to his own people including political parties supported by India but he resisted New Delhi’s coercive diplomacy to impose yet another unjust treaty.
Still Indian options did not exhaust and it could extract concessions from political forces – indebted to it because of its previous support to them – that could come into power after the elections.
This scenario suggests that India had a win-win situation in either case; i.e. to extract concessions from a regime pressurized and besieged by armed opposition groups or from the political parties, the potential rulers of the future but indebted to India for its previous support to them.
In this situation, second option was still available to India.
It shows that big powers generally have far more options at their disposal to pursue their objectives particularly when there also exist elements willing to act as proxies in a neighboring country than the small states which have little maneuverability in such circumstances.
India’s Quest to Extract Undue Concessions in the Democratic Era:
India’s interference in Nepalese affairs, extraction of concessions through either coercion of or support to different actors and, partly for these reasons, assistance for insurgencies continued even after 1990.
It had two dimensions: first, India’s extraction of unequal concessions from indebted leaders in Kathmandu that created strong resentment and frustration in Nepal.
Second, India supported Nepalese insurgents to keep governments in Kathmandu under pressure to extort further concessions.
As the new government under prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala was set up after restoration of democracy and first multiparty general elections held in May 1991, India signed the Tanakpur Water Project Agreement (TWPA) with Kathmandu.
Many Nepalese regarded this agreement as unjust. Reportedly, the agreement signed in December 1991 was a source of ‘shock’ for many Nepalese and opposition to TWPA was so strong that it led to the fall of the Koirala government in 1994.
A short survey of Indo-Nepalese agreements to develop their shared rivers’ waters is worth to comprehend the real causes of widespread resentment and anti-India feelings in Kathmandu.
Several rivers originate in Himalayas and flows through Nepal into India (and Bangladesh) that necessitates agreements on sharing, management and development of their waters for diverse reasons, such as flood control, irrigation, navigation, and production of hydropower etc.
The history of agreements on various projects such as construction of barrages etc. on shared rivers dates back to British era, which Nepalese commentators generally term as just ones.
The controversies started in the post-British era, particularly with signing of Indo-Nepalese Koshi River Project Agreement (KRPA), signed in 1954.
The project envisioned construction of head works, barrages, canals and flood banks on Koshi River, often known as river of ‘sorrows’ because of the devastation it caused in Nepal and Indian state of Bihar.
Under the agreement, India was given extraterritorial rights on Nepalese Land in lieu of the entire cost of the project to be borne by New Delhi. In 1959, both states concluded Gandak Irrigation and Power Project Agreement (GIPPA) which was relatively favorable to Nepal than KRPA.
However, it was also bitterly criticized by opposition groups in Nepal because of alleged insufficient potential benefits for the country as compared to the cost to be born.
Due to growing resentment and widespread criticism in Nepal, India agreed to revise the terms of both agreements and deleted some provisions from KRPA in a treaty signed in December 1966.
Nonetheless, the controversies could not be removed completely and both countries exchanged proposals and counter-proposals till 1991 when they signed TWPA.
The agreement that provided for construction of a barrage at Tanakpur was again viewed by many in Nepal as unjust and imposed one by New Delhi.
Reportedly, the Nepalese prime minister, who being indebted to India for its past support wanted to appease New Delhi, and signed the agreement in haste and without much homework.
There has been a widespread perception in Nepal that these treaties were unequal and unjust in terms of distribution of cost and benefits for the both parties.
Nepalese believed that Kathmandu paid the cost in terms of loss of fertile land, natural habitat, displacement of people, environmental degradation, inundation during rainy season and none or little water during dry season.
It also compromised sovereign rights on its territory and got little benefits in terms of water for irrigation and other usages and electricity etc.
Nepalese also believed that India mainly benefitted in several rather all respects from these water projects but it did not compensate Kathmandu for the losses it bore.
In order to bring an end to the controversies over TWPA and assuage other Nepalese concerns over sharing of their common water resources, New Delhi signed with Kathmandu the Integrated Development of Mahakali River Treaty (IDMRT) in March 1996 but it further aggravated the situation.
IDMRT was concluded after consensus among all political parties in Nepal but it also led to controversies. Initially, a number of leaders and commentators in Nepal had welcomed the treaty believing that it laid down ‘the foundation for the sharing of international waters on an egalitarian basis.’
Nevertheless, many in Nepal believed that India ‘cheated’ them as in the past, and it would mainly benefit India as did the previous agreements.
3.3 India’s Support for Maoists Insurgency:
3.4 The opposition to these agreements played important role in the growth of ‘strong nationalist-minded politics in Nepal, especially for the left movement.’
Particularly, the Mahakali treaty resulted in disunity among the Nepalese communists.
It was signed during the coalition government in which the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) was a partner and its leader Bamdev Gautam held the position of the deputy prime minister.
CPN-UML supported the ratification of the treaty in the parliament. However, a number of members of parliament (MPs) from the party were opposed to the treaty who abstained during the ratification process.
It created split in the party and this group of MPs broke away from CPN-UML and formed CPN-ML (Marxist-Leninists). The opposition to IDMRT also led to the Maoist insurgency.
Reaction to India’s interference in its domestic affairs, the imposition of unequal and unfair treaties and abuse of its resources created anti-India feelings and strong nationalism that gave rise to Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
On 4 February 1996, the Maoists submitted to the government an ultimatum to accept their 40 point demands of which three were directly related to India; and two out of the three about allegedly Indo–Nepalese agreements.
The first demand sought the deletion of ‘all unequal stipulations and agreements’ from the 1950 agreement, second one required nullification of IDMRT and Tanakpur agreement, and third demand wanted a systemic control over Indo–Nepal border and ban on free entry of vehicles with Indian number plates.
The other demands were related mainly to restructuring of the state and drafting of the new constitution by a constituent assembly.
Kathmandu rejected their demands and ultimatum after which Maoists unleashed terrorist activities in February 1996 that lasted for about 10 years. The insurgency took lives of over 13,000 people.
Ironically Maoists had started their ‘people’s war’ on the name of anti-Indianism but ultimately they used Indian soil to perpetuate violence in Nepal.
It shows the extent to which Indian security agencies can enter into alliance with their apparent enemies and use them to undermine security of a neighboring state.
Nepalese Maoists used India’s bordering area as ‘safe hideout’ since start of the insurgency.
Whenever Nepali army or police force pressed them hard, they quietly moved to Indian soil to stay until conditions became normal for them on Nepalese side.
Their training camps were also located in frontier areas which helped them to cross the border whenever needed.
Rebels wounded in combats with Nepalese security forces were generally treated in hospitals in India.
In 2002, the then prime minister of Nepal, Sher Bahadur Deuba during his official visit to New Delhi told media that Nepalese authorities were ‘alarmed at the presence of some of the top Maoist leaders in India and the fact that they [were] directing the violence in Nepal.’
He also told that Nepal had demanded New Delhi to take action against Maoists based in India. Kathmandu wanted that ‘the Maoists do not use Indian soil against Nepal.’ Deuba also told that he got a ‘favorable reply’ from New Delhi.
India, in fact, played a dual role in Maoists insurgency, and supported both the rebels as well as Nepalese government in their combat against each other.
Its policy towards the problem also shifted over time.
Initially, it did not take the issue seriously but it changed its policy after 9/11 and declared Nepalese Maoists a ‘terrorist group’ as they made an alliance with their likeminded groups in India.
New Delhi provided weapons to Nepalese government and apparently endorsed the support from the US and the UK to Kathmandu in its counter insurgency campaign.
However, it also turned a blind eye on Nepalese Maoists who lived on and operated from India territory.
They used Indian soil as safe havens for their meetings, shelter and conduit of arms and weapons.
At times, India arrested a few Maoists and handed them over to Nepal but most of the times New Delhi did not cooperate with Kathmandu on its demand to check or exchange information about Maoists activities.
Some of the Indian political parties, mostly leftists, openly supported the Maoists while its security agencies often ignored their activities.
# Its concluding part will soon begin with India’s Role in Bringing down the Monarchy: Upadhyaya.
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