Digital globalization: Making sense of the Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative
Professor Tone Bleie
UiT, Norway’s Arctic University, Norway
Why DSR matters in our global, regional, and national affairs
For nearly a decade, media, policy makers and analysts of globalization and the emerging multipolar order have sought to make sense of “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). Terrestrial infrastructure, be it highways, dams, smart cities apart from ports and ship lanes as oceanic infrastructure tend to dominate debates. The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is receiving surprisingly meagre and superficial attention. That is most unfortunate. The ongoing digital wiring connecting national, regional, and planetary scales is about to transform our global, regional and national affairs in unprecedented ways, without much informed political debate, legislation and social science research.
This DRI story begins with a recall about the Beijing 2017 BRI Forum, before shedding light on certain mega-projects of the DSR-industry. By illustrating the scale, services and ownership structures, this op-ed ends with a set of pressuring questions about digital governance and civil liberties, to be discussed in a future op-ed. Notably few of us as internet users have even basic ideas about the “architecture” of the internet, which is essential for digital literary and informed opinions of internet governance. As users we mostly care about:
-Digital technology with computing ability or a portable wireless computing device (cell phones etc.),
-Content (texts, imagery, video),
-Applications (software such as Microsoft outlook that gives us access and share information),
-Links (Ethernet cables and routers).
Then we tend to care less about the two remaining vital parts of “internet architecture”.
The is Coding – communication protocols that enables information to travel though physical wired nodes and networks. The second is Physical Networks by connections such as satellite links (space domain) and the wiring – fiber optic cables in the oceans or on land. This DRI story addresses primarily the two final vital parts of this architecture.
The importance of the Belt and Road Forum in 2017
Following the BRI Forum in Beijing in 2017, DSR became a common translation for China’s digital globalization under the “Made in China 2025” plan. This received a massive investment push from 2020 onward, in the order of nearly 1, 5 trillion US dollar. The immediate context? In part the US government’s effort to harm China’s rise as a technology giant since it challenges (mostly) US dominance in certain sectors.
First, what is DSI all about? In seductively simple technical terms is about “connectivity” within, across and between East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Easter and Western Africa and Europe. Notably, President Xi’s speech at the BRI Forum in 2017 conveyed considerably more sophisticated ideas than plainly connectivity. The President emphasized policy communication and trade unblocking. Indeed, Xi did talk about connectively through infrastructure, emphasizing cyberspace interoperability or even compatible international standards. Such interoperability offers lucrative prospects for an expanding global business within which private companies’ commercial satellites has overtaken a previously completely state dominated domain.
The importance of global standards settings and protocols
The importance of interoperability and aligned standards extend further. China has in recent years reformed a state-driven standards-setting (the China Standards 2035) which is like the industry-driven voluntary standards in Europe and the US. BRI offers golden opportunities for standards-setting with many partner countries like Nepal, the BRIC countries (India, China, Russia, and Brazil) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. And indeed, also with the global apex body, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).
Supported by developing countries, China is about to strengthen its position in ISO as the prime global body of the shaping of norms, rules, and practices. This weakens the US global dominance. This is a very interesting development in ISO deserves attention. If common standards are not established and adhered to, less powerful countries in this game, including local city authorities might as customers of rivaling high-tech superpowers, find themselves in very uncomfortable situations, pressured to choose between giant-providers which take “a winner takes all approach.”
Wiring within Asia and connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe Connectively or global wiring, is about submarine and terrestrial cables, and much more (confer the architecture model). In recent years, cables have been deployed and are currently laid at unprecedented speed over enormous distances by Chinese companies in cooperation with Asian, African, and European partners. What is essential to not overlook is that cables are integrated with the space domain via satellites. In the advanced circuits of three domain infrastructure, Chinese companies are becoming more important. Notably, this industry is, as argued, about much more than connectively in simple technical terms.
This is about vital control of digital information by civilian authorities, warring states, the intelligence industry, military industries, the private high-tech sector – including the behemoths Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple, about “us” as public institutions, individual consumers and citizens. Moreover, this is about critically important maintenance issues and the future of electoral democracy, safety, warfare, and sabotage. There is a nearly unprecedented scope of surveillance and influences of clients, consumers, travelers, combatants, civil activists, journalists, policy makers and voters. The relative strengths of superpowers, EU, if the union prevails, allied states, state subsidiaries, private digital behemoths, citizens – and consumers are changing.
Expanding DSR-infrastructure
Implementation of all planned DSR-projects is uneven for a range of reasons. Still more is completed and underway than Western corporately owned media report on. Take internet infrastructure in consortium projects involving Chinese tele companies. In Nepal and its neighborhood there are the submarine Bay of Bengal Gateway (BBG) from Malaysia to UAE and the Southeast Asia-Middle East -Western Europe cables. The latter cables will be connecting SEA, ME, and Europe with 46 locations by 2024. Cable landing in Genova occurred early this year. If the three continental cables are fully completed, about 35 per cent of the world’s population will be connected through the largest subsea cable ever deployed (45 000 km), with terrestrial connections in Pakistan (Karachi) and India (Mumbai). China Mobile and several partners are involved.
The Nepal-China optical fiber link became operative in early 2018 with again China Mobile responsible for the nodal connection with Nepal at Rasuwagadi-Jilong Gateway. Nepal Telecom rolled out 90-km cables to the Chinese border. India’s internet monopoly in Nepal is therefore no more. Similarly, Chinese companies are involved in several DSR-initiatives promoting cross-border cables between Pakistan and China. Pakistan East Africa Cable Express (PEACE) is one current construction and supply of optic cables project. PEACE complements earlier terrestrial cable network (Transit Europe-Asia) and opens a direct high- speed route between Asia and Africa, with landing points in Karachi and Gwadar. Overall, Pakistan with its huge and young population is an attractive market for Chinese high-tech companies.
Not all planned projects do materialize. Geopolitics and deteriorating Nordics-Russia relations mattered when the Arctic Connect Telecom Cable Project was put on hold in June 2021. Apparently, there were also investor uncertainty and cost-issues. Some of the Nordic companies involved in the stranded initiative negotiate now with EU for an alternative Arctic Europe-Asia route via Alaska. In the current thriving broadband infrastructure sector, Chinese companies pave the way for other Chinese and many other foreign companies. They do also compete with Nordic companies, Telenor (Norway), Ericsson (Sweden) and Nokia (Finland).
Great power rivalry in the digital economy and governance The US-government, other Western governments, civil society groups and experts raise questions about the actual relations between the Chinese state and “so-called” private Chinese companies. This debate is warranted. But it needs a broader focus than the CPR party-state alone. Telenor was a fully state-owned Norwegian company, which was listed on Nasdaq and Oslo Stock Exchange in 2000 CE. The Norwegian state remains today the main shareholder with 53, 97 per cent of the shares, as of 1 of January 2021. The Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries manage the ownership based on principles of good governance on behalf of the larger society. In other words, the issues are really about principles of good governance (what do they entail?) and are they really implemented?
The Chinese one-party state interface with two categories of companies, (1) the directly state-owned enterprises such as China Unicom, China Telecom and (2) formally private companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, ZTE (all shortcut names). The relationship between the directly state owned and the party-state is rather evident, and they show “muscles” globally. China Mobile Telecom (the state owns 97-percent of the shares) is currently the third largest cooperation after AT&; T (HQ in Dallas) and Verizon (HQ in New York). However, what has caused the US government and its Ministry of Justice more concern – are the nature of relations between CPR-state and the formally private high-tech companies. Now it can be argued that that from a liberal American perspective Norway is another case of state capitalism – and as such socialist. Our digital industries (with the state is a majority shareholder) do not pose proportionately a 5threat, as the largest Chinese enterprises do.
Recently, the Chinese state reigned in on private technology companies. Its legitimacy and capacity do so should not be automatically criticized. Some of the regulations may serve highly justified societal interests in China. The Norwegian state for example, ought to reign in on state and municipal companies that operate in a liberalized stock-market driven European energy sector.
Next questions: the global governance architecture
The purpose of this op-ed is twofold:
-To outline a concept of internet architecture and situate the Digital Silk Road (DSR) within this model. DSR arguably deserves greater attention of BRI as a major driving force for an expanding wired regional and global landscapes.
-The second purpose is to offer illuminating examples of certain completed and evolving initiatives in the neighborhoods of respectively landlocked Nepal and the Arctic to highlight the scale and nature of rapid technological, social, and political changes. These calls for a next set of questions about global governance. That should not be confined to a selective debate of the challenges posed by Chinese companies through the DSR.
Many would like to put their faith in the European Union’s data protection regime, which asserts jurisdiction over the processing of EU citizens personal data regardless of where in the world such processing takes place. It is probably too naïve to assume the EU will be able to dictate the terms of data regulations at a global level. Neither should we ignore the protracted transatlantic struggle (EU-US) over freedoms and security. The right to privacy and basic freedoms of citizens as enshrined in international and national laws remains at risk. The contours of the surveillance state are real. Overall, we need to be less morally alarmed by the ongoing propaganda war and examine rigorously the how governance and ownership structures interface in our countries, in the rivalling grand powers, and globally.
# About the author: Tone Bleie is Professor of Public Policy and Cultural Understanding at UiT, Norway’s Arctic University. Bleie work as development executive, researcher, consultant in and on Nepal, the Greater Himalayas, and the Tibetan Plateau spans three decades. Her early engagement in Nepal was as Deputy Regional Rep. and Program Director of Norwegian Redd Barna (1993-1995) and Board Member of ICIMOD (1999-2005).
Bleie can be reached at tone.bleie@uit.no
# Our own contact email address is: editor.telegraphnepal@gmail.com