Nepal: Foreign Policy Path Ahead-2

Ruckus of New Geopolitics

Professor Dev Raj Dahal

Senior Political Analyst

Nepal

During his meet with counterpart Wang Yi the latter (Nepal Foreign Minister) restated China’s continued and unconditional support to “Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,” activate Nepal-China Joint Border Inspection Committee in view of border dispute in Humla district of Nepal and increased grants and investments to help Nepal to escape from Sri Lanka-type of situation.

As a rising superpower, China is proactive in its initiatives and soft power strategy and stressing on wider level of cooperation under Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network through rail, tunnel, opening more routes and upgrading the existing ones and strategic partnership with Nepal. The ties are glued by cooperation on educational, health and economic and ecological areas. The execution of road, infrastructure, energy, trade and transit projects and corridors can be expected to transform Nepal from what Xi Jinping said “land locked to land-linked nation.”

He underscored the need for “more exchange and experience sharing on governance and development to deliver greater benefits to the peoples,” strengthen Nepali state’s capacity and will to carry on law enforcement,” “broader defense contacts for common Himalayan security” to fight subversive internal and external elements and “ensure the safety of peoples and trade” by extending cooperation on matters of training, equipment and technologies. These issues are not different from the various statements when Nepali prime ministers visited India. Yet, the execution BRI, transit and railway link and hydro-project hit a snag. Nepali leaders fear the nation landing into debt trap, find no modality of sharing costs and alienating India and the Western powers who often misjudge Nepali leaders moving closer to China. Now China knows how left leaders’ worldview is shaped by “attributional affinity” to India and the West. Despite the Chinese protest Nepal has accepted $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation American aid as an incentive for joining the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Its major component, inter alia, is designed to support 400 KV New Butwal-Gorakhpur transmission line projects.

Territorial disputes and conflict escalation motivated India to organize a joint military drill with the US on the border facing China this year October while expecting Chinese support for its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. China perceives India as a conduit for Western strategic maneuver but also knows the reason for not joining its QUAD partners to criticize China's military drill in Taiwan.

Fifth, the new geopolitics has offered an opportunity Nepal to join rival institutions. Nepali leaders know how to play a realpolitik game based on the calculation of national interests. British policy of self-distancing from the EU and joining China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Italy’s joining of BRI, India’s joining of AIIB, SCO and BRICS and Germany and France deepening economic cooperation with China and building global strategic partnership reflect a policy of realpolitik. China has offered an alternative to the West dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund by creating AIBB and New Development Bank with BRICKS members.

The EU and Japan have recently made a deal to link Europe and Asia and coordinate infrastructure, transport and digital projects as a counter to China’s projects. India is less interested in BRI partly because of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and partly on the grounds of territorial row.

Yet, it is a member of BRICS, SCO, Boao Forum for Asia and maintains strategic neutrality between EU, China, Russia, Israel and the USA. The US strategy to retain its supremacy in the world, India’s aspiration for global power and strategy to counter initiatives of China has brought Nepal in the forefront of the geopolitical game where India and the West find converging interests in South China Sea and the Himalayas though Russia, a close friend of China and India, may suggest the latter not to join Sinophobic crusade. The Sino-Indian bilateral trade has surged over $1 billion, China is the largest trading partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It is successful in its African, Middle Eastern and Latin American diplomacy.

The US defines Nepal as a strong pivot in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and has accepted Nepal Army’s written request to the US in 2015 to join the State Partnership Program (SPP) for cooperation in disaster preparedness, Partnership in Status of Force Agreement and Mutual Defense Treaty for defense cooperation which allow letting some members of the US security forces stay in Nepal for an indefinite period and ward off foreign threat and constitutional crisis sparked controversy.

Under the SPP Nepal Army has already received two helicopters and expects two more. The consensus among the ruling and opposition parties of Nepal eased the endorsement of the MCC. It is marked by a flurry of exchange of high level visits between the two nations affirming former Nepali foreign minister’s open articulation for “resetting Nepal’s foreign policy,” “scaling up the nation’s ties” with the US and the nourishing a perception that the “US will not see Nepal through Indian eyes.” The SPP program has opened a crack in the coalition government and within Nepali Congress Party as some of its leaders believe it a clear deviation from the nation’s non-aligned foreign policy and, therefore, based on the recommendation of the cabinet Foreign Ministry has written a letter to the US expressing Nepal’s inability to endorse the SPP.

Legislators however wanted to know the contents of the letter and asked the government to become accountable to the parliament. The only state-bearing institution Nepal Army is interested in seeking cooperation from the US to modernize Nepal Army with logistic, training and material support and regularly participates in the joint drill of Indo-Pacific armies under the US Command. When both neighbors have innovated “neighbors’ first” and peripheral diplomacy and are engaged in creating a strip of buffer zone in Nepal for their border security, the USA has suggested fragile Nepali leaders to become pro-Nepal to safeguard sovereignty, security and freedom (Adhikary, 2005: 45).

Combining Eurasian land-based continental and maritime trade-dependent global strategy, China defends globalization finding it suitable to the global scale project of the centrality of Eurasian heartland through BRI, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Silk Road initiative, set a grouping of the regionally influential powers of the third world such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa ( BRICS ) and wean away US phobic Middle Eastern, Latin American and African countries through investment, aid packages and connectivity. But the new strategic partnership of South Asian leaders with external powers especially with the USA, Japan, EU, Russia and Israel has made their ties more regime-oriented and geopolitical in nature rather than rule-based, benefitting the ordinary citizens’ cry for essential public good, smooth energy supply, control inflation, create jobs and alleviate poverty. India has improved ties with the US on trade, commerce, security and multi-scale exchange of official visits, increased defense cooperation with Russia and scaled up economic cooperation with China despite border clashes.

Nepal is reclaiming its policy of diversification to improve its foreign policy maneuver and reap resources for the modernization of domestic society at a time when geo-economic strategy requires the affirmation of geopolitical alliances while globalization of ties and denationalization of national society demand competency of intra-societal forces.

Sixth, new geopolitics is imagined as a polarity between free nations and autocracy. The USA’s policy to clip India to control China’s expanding influence in South Asia, Indian Ocean, South China Sea and the Arabian Sea, however, is feverishly defined by common democratic legitimacy. Its back away to “America first,” sudden departure from Afghanistan without consulting allies and less than warm relationship with Europe, the Middle Eastern, African and Latin American nations showed weak imperial leadership of the liberal order to carry the burden of the new world order. The new alliance of democratic nations does not inspire Islamic states, Africa and catholic region of Latin America though Nepal, India and the Maldives are a part of it.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal on October 12-13, 2019 elevated bilateral ties to a strategic level like those with India, the UK and the USA. Earlier Nepal has signed trade and transit treaties with China, declared Nepal’s northern 15 districts facing Tibet a “restricted zone,” pledged commitment to one-China policy, not to allow its territory to be used against China and sought to alleviate the Chinese fear of global convergence of interests on Tibet, a place of enormous geostrategic value for its location as a roof of world. It also possesses huge subterranean resources such as blue water, uranium and petroleum products.

China, considering Nepal a gateway for South Asia, has set up a mechanism to coordinate Chinese aid and investment to Nepal, signed deals on border management, mutual legal assistance and organized regular joint military drills. India too is engaged in South Asia in similar support, not directly countering China like the US.

Foreign Policy Choices for Nepal:

What are the strategies Nepal should adopt in the changed geo-strategic shift in the realm of foreign policy?

Seek Non-Hegemonic, Just Order:

Small states often demand from the world system equality and justice, not hegemony. A world of multi- polarity offers Nepal a better choice to balance hegemonic relations with big powers who provide norms for its behavior and apply carrot and stick policy depending on the conduct of its leaders. Nepali foreign policy success rests on context-driven cooperative relations to ensure its security, sovereignty and progress, not ideological. Nepal’s charismatic Prime Minister B. P. Koirala had long ago spoken at the UN that the nation “judges every international issue on its merits without consideration of any body’s fear or favor” (Bhattarai,2022:4). His aversion to a Manichean outlook, merely substituting one power for another, is aimed to dissociate ideology in interstate relations. Nepali leaders have experienced that hegemony without the responsibility to protect its security, wellbeing and identity has bred negative feelings among the people and popular defiance. The policies of nonalignment, neutralism, self-distancing, equi-proximity, regionalism, etc were precisely crafted to spur non-hegemonic ties based on sovereign equality. But the UN, SAARC, BBIN, BIMSTEC and other regional bodies have to renew their élan vitals to achieve collective self-reliance and increase leverage for bargaining on issues of regional and global public good. The absolutely national interest course of states failed to pool sovereignties to muster regional loyalties and fortify ties for sharing the burden and benefits of common good. The declining utility of SAARC can be attributed to this fact. The neorealist’s belief that neither Hobbesian human nature nor foreign policy is the extension of domestic politics explains state’s external action is valid. Nepali leaders can learn from it.

Domestic peace does not make Nepal immune from the perils of external risks. The “keys to war and peace lie in the structure of the international system rather than in the nature of individual states” (Mearsheimer, 1999: 108-9). States have disparate images of self, intentions, capabilities, aspirations and imperatives. They hatch varied actors- state, non-state, multi-national, private sector, INGOs etc in shaping both hard power and soft power diplomacy. Nepali leaders must have coordinating ability about the incentives of global public good they offer to alleviate scarcity and alley fear of external power projection in the native society by stoking centrifugal forces, engaging in micro management or use any part of population as a strategic asset to weaken the nation’s heartland’s survival strategy.

Perform Balancing Act of Relationship:

Nepal, by virtue of its geographical pivot, has to maintain its classical internal and external middle path, not ideological or revolutionary one, to rationally navigate in multi-polarized world politics. The nation’s internal political polarization and external fears have strained its foreign policy efficacy in keeping the spell of traditional balance of power and set its frontiers and buffer spaces safe from outside penetration infecting state weakness. “The distribution of power and the balance of threat do influence domestic institutional formation and change in the small states” (Elman, 1993: 171). This shows that the external milieu has always remained a catalyst of change in Nepal and its institutional evolution. Both India and the USA are China’s major trading partners but also security, trade and political competitors and rivals. They are tied by a common liberal worldview, shared narratives of international relations and defense agreements. The US President Joe Biden’s readiness to assume international responsibilities has spurred many initiatives: to rebuild democratic fraternity, augment multilateralism, dialogue and diplomacy with China committing the latter to a web of liberal international norms, rules and institutions aspiring to preserve global order, peace and public good. This will enable it to reassume the mantle of statesmanship and fight a range of common issues — climate change, pandemic, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, poverty, inequality, migration, etc. Still, the US and India are wary of China’s growing heft in Nepal, its strategic partnership to boost security, connectivity, tourism, trade, investments in hydropower, energy, transport and increase of soft power of learning from China’s experience in party, government and development, albeit its liberal Constitution and worldview are close to them. India with its own global aspiration and affinity with Russia, China’s close ally, will be less willing to be used by the US as a pawn against China and accept the role of a junior partner.

The West and India’s democracy promotion in Nepal now remains contested as they have fostered postmodern neo-liberal economy, identity politics and corrosively partisan interest, not citizenship values for state building, thus fuelling centrifugal forces against heartland elites’ centripetal desire. Inter-party and inter-government solidarity for democracy promotion or change of regime relativizes national sovereignty fusing democracy and realpolitik. China has also espoused its own model of a community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility based on national sovereignty and non-interference but seek regime stability in Nepal for the resolution of the security dilemma. It believes that an independent Nepal will not be an easy prey of outside powers to act as conduit to anti-Chinese activities.

China’s failure to stop the split of Communist Party of Nepal is viewed by the Indian foreign policy experts a setback to it which is favorable to India overlooking the fact that many leaders harbor memories of the Indian blockade against the promulgation of constitution by Prime Minister Sushil Koirala, support to the agitation of Terai holding frontier mentality, hard look at upper caste hill elites for their alleged domination of the other, slow performance of its projects and border disputes. Now the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party of India is seeking to deepen ties with Nepal’s major parties including Maoist-Center. For many years, the inclination of CPN to lift up ties with China left India and the West dejected and sought a common policy to roll back its rising influence in Nepal. Closure of all import-substituting industries constructed with the Chinese and the Soviet grant can be attributed to reducing the impact of their influence. The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Nepal in October 2019 marked a high point in bilateral ties eased by earlier agreements on transport and transit, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity aiming to transform Nepal from landlocked to land-linked nation, reduce dependence on other powers and boost Nepal’s ability to modernize its economy and assert foreign policy of its choice. Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe’s visit to Nepal on November 29, 2020 sought to enhance “mutual military assistance and strengthen the existing ties between the two countries.”

Given the inertia of SAARC, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi organized two webinars with the foreign ministers of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan to promote regional cooperation of four nations in combating COVID-19 and enhancing progress through BRI.

Nepal-India ties are governed by shared cultural roots, open border, Gorkha agreement, treaties and socio-economic cooperation that transcend individual leaders. Flurry of exchange of visits of senior government and political officials from each other’s countries is aimed at improving ties caused by a wide range of issues including former Prime Minister K. P. Oli’s perception that India is trying to oust him.

RAW Chief S. K. Goyal

The meeting of Samant Kumar Goel, chief of India’s Research and Analysis Wing with him sparked off controversy within NCP for failing to employ diplomatic and political channels and respect diplomatic code of conduct. This visit came in the midst of shabby Nepal-India ties over the boundary issues following Indian statement of the opening of road link via Lipulek to Kailash Mansarovar in Tibet and Nepali government’s publication of new political map showing Kalapani, Lipulek and Limpiyadhura as Nepali territories on the basis of all-party consensus.

This is followed by Indian Army General Manoj Mukund Narvane’s visit to Nepal. His remarks on Nepal’s objection to India’s opening of a road link via Lipulek at the ‘behest of someone else’ indicating China, ignited repulsive debate.

On November 27, 2021 Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla came to Kathmandu on a confidence building tour. Subsequently, Vijay Chauthaiwale, who heads the foreign department cell of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, visited Nepal to meet leaders from across the political spectrum to show cultural and political affinity. The growing convergence of India and the West scares China and shores up higher stake in Nepal’s sovereignty, stability and progress for reasons to protect its investment, security of Tibet, boost strategic partnership and connectivity and develop market outlets in South Asia.

China’s pro-active diplomacy with the mainstream political parties, thus, aims at securing a favorable government in Nepal which is less entangled with anti-Chinese forces in its northern region.

The Indian suspect of China and, occasionally the West, expressed in its media and diplomatic circle, has often caught Nepali leaders in a deadlock situation with BRI, not animating it though it has strategic value to satisfy the nation’s need for infrastructural development and transform Nepali economy from consumption to production-oriented one. Non-implementation of agreements can erode the nation’s image, acceptability and credibility. This means Nepali leaders must find a way to escape from being trapped in indecision and follow traditional practices, diplomatic code and protocol, the Constitution and engage foreign ministry officials when they meet their foreign counterpart missions, officials and leaders so that media and intellectuals do not have to speculate and indulge in multiple interpretations about the nation’s foreign policy.

Concluding Part to begin with: Play Non-Zero Sum Game.

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