M. R. Josse
Former Editor-in-Chief
The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu. Nepal
Is a major shift in India’s China policy on the anvil, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic? Or, more specifically, will New Delhi henceforth propel its China policy away from its hitherto finely calibrated “not-a-friend, not-a-foe’ stance towards a direction more in tune, or aligned, with the United States’ China policy?
Not being imbued with the powers of clairvoyance, I shall refrain from any reckless prognosis, one way or another.
Instead, in this space, I will merely attempt to ‘read’ some politico-diplomatic tea leaves on the fecund China-India-United States ground, hoping that such an effort will provide some clarity or edification on the subject of this exegesis.
Change is in the Air:
Allow me, without further ado, to tackle the crux of the issue under examination, beginning with a revealing write-up in the Hindustan Times, (27 April, 2020) by C. Uday Bhaskar, Director, Society for Public Policy Studies, New Delhi. The thrust of his thoughtful essay is that New Delhi should engage with all powers – in particular, the U.S., the Eurozone and China – and resist calls to ally with the U.
S. against Beijing.
He believes that the domestic politics of the major powers in the post-corona virus era – dubbed by some as the AC, or After Corona, age – will see a significant churn, driven by emotive nationalism; a conclusion that is hard to fault.
Bhaskar thinks, to boot, that “the shrill focus on this issue in the U.S. election campaign is a case in point.” He then goes on to posit that “China, the EU, Russia and Japan will follow a similar trajectory, where the credibility of the current leadership will be put to the test.”
He declares that India would be no exception to such a state of affairs; moreover, that tackling the problems triggered by the pandemic will be “the single most complex challenge facing Prime Minister Narendra Modi.” Elaborating on the latter point, Bhaskar – a former senior naval officer, I believe-has these additional observations to serve up.
“Thus, despite the current turbulence and negative sentiment about China, in particular, the more prudent strategic orientation for India will be to create the necessary politico-diplomatic and economic space to remain engaged with the major powers and trading blocs, however insular they may have become in the short-term.”
He reminds readers that India’s external orientation after the end of the cold war has been to remain engaged with all global nodes but to remain unaligned particularly in the military domain. After corona, he argues, proceeding on such a path would be more profitable for India than, as is being suggested in some quarters in New Delhi today, “that India should join hands with the U.S.-led cluster that will lean on China to atone for its many omissions that range from creating COVID-19, to issues like Doklam, support to Pakistan, and blocking India’s admission to the nuclear order.”
Anti-China Wind:
Be that as it may, what is plain enough is that there is an anti-China wind discernibly blowing through the corridors of the Indian foreign/security policy edifice.
A little more than a month ago, for example, The Diplomat not merely informed readers that plans for celebrating the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and China “have been hit by the pandemic”, but also that “the pandemic seems to indicate to New Delhi that China is likely to be an irresponsibly selfish actor, deepening the concern that India had about China’s behavior”.
A fortnight later, Republicworld.
com, expounding on the subject, ‘India-China relations in a post-Covid-19 world’, recommended this revealing policy prescription.
“Against China, India hasn’t always exhibited the same resolve in foreign policy matters that is has against Pakistan. The Chinese economic might, second only to the United States, was probably a deterrent against China and its policies.
But with the Covid-19 pandemic, China has lost its “aura’ and India must be quick to recognize this shift and seize the initiative and make some much-needed tactical and strategic changes to its China policy.”
Around the same time from the Indian capital The Statesman in an editorial entitled, ‘China and the World’, pontificated: “The world is puzzled over the praxis adopted by Beijing. Beijing’s handling of Covid-19 has jolted the world.” In its opinion, there is now “an increasingly hostile view of China across the world – a dismal reflection of the leadership of the President-for-life Xi Jinping, who, to put it mildly, has lost his credibility.
Finally, about a week ago, an Indian TV channel, India Today, not only reported that India’s national security council had initiated an official probe into whether Covid-19 was indeed produced in a Wuhan laboratory, as recklessly charged, among others, by President Donald Trump, but, in an interview with an American expert resident in Beijing, its news anchor abruptly terminated the former’s robust defence against those allegations. Apparently, the news pundit was not prepared to let India Today’s viewership listen to views opposed to his!
It may be germane at this stage to recall that, thus far, the Indian government has been careful not to blame China for the corona virus or its propagation.
Status of Ties:
Before continuing any further, it will be appropriate to mull over some key features of the 70 year-old China-India relationship which is, undoubtedly, of global and strategic significance. It may also serve a useful purpose to recall that China and India are both members of such important global organizations/mechanisms as the China-Russia-India trilateral, BRICS, SCO and G-20. That aside, they do share many common interests and have adopted similar positions vis-à-vis promoting globalization and opposing trade protectionism.
While the India-China boundary question is unresolved to date, despite 21 rounds of meetings between their special representatives since 2003, “over the past decade, no single bullet has been fired at the China-India border area and peace and tranquility have been maintained,” as claimed by the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, in an interview to Suhasini Haider, of The Hindu published on 8 October 2019.
[To be noted is that the disputed territory of Doklam is in the China-Bhutan area and that India supports Bhutan’s claim to the territory.]
What should not be overlooked is that, in economy and trade, China has long been India’s largest trading partner, while India is China’s largest trading partner in South Asia. On the other side of the ledger are, of course, such sturdy bugbears as India’s continuing asylum to the Dalai Lama, permitting the so-called Tibetan “government-in-exile’ to function from Indian soil, and China’s “blocking of India’s admission to the nuclear order” to quote Bhaskar – not to forget Beijing’s opposition to India’s long-cherished ambition to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council The last-listed issue particularly rankles in India, whose retiring U.N. ambassador, Syed Akhbaruddin, explained to The Hindu the other day: “One of India’s aspirational goals was, is, and will remain, permanent membership of the Security Council, because we feel by all present day calculus we would qualify.
In any case, it would be remiss not to refer to India’s past attempts to join, or breathe life into, the oft-mentioned “Quad”, the camouflaged politico-diplomatic arrangement envisaged to contain China and whose core members are the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia. Though, thus far, that idea hasn’t really gone operational, it is quite possible that, against the backdrop of the current pandemic, that situation could dramatically change – to China’s detriment.
To appreciate that prospect, allow me to refer to a recent think-piece in The Dawn, of Karachi, penned by Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistan ambassador to the U.N., the U.K. and the U.S. Expounding on the broader theme of Post-corona crisis global realities’, she touches upon the current fraught relationship between the United States and China.
She argues that, despite the volatile relationship between the two economically interdependent but strategic competitors, the United States and China will nonetheless need each other’s cooperation to restart their economies and steer global recovery in the post-pandemic world.
She laments: “Unfortunately, though, China-bashing by American leaders has continued…By far, the most extraordinary development at the height of the pandemic was President Trump’s stinging attack on the WHO, the multilateral agency dealing with the corona crisis, and his decision to suspend funding for it. Trump accused it of mismanagement of the outbreak and being ‘China-centric’ The U.S. presidential election later this year will be critical for its (the international order’s) global impact. Its outcome may not overturn trends already in play but it could have a major influence on the future of the fraying multilateral system.”
Trump and Timing Factor:
We have briefly touched upon Trump’s anti-China outbursts vis-à-vis the corona virus pandemic. Let us now delve on the subject at some greater depth.
Not only has the American president charged WHO for being “China-centric’ and labeled Covid-19 the ‘Chinese virus’ but has alleged that the deadly virus may have indeed originated in a Chinese virology laboratory. Tellingly, not only has he not produced any evidence to back his incendiary assertion but the conclusion of the U.S. intelligence community is that the virus was not man-made!
The New York Times (2 May 2020) informs us that the Trump administration is preparing to take a more aggressive stand against China on economic, diplomatic and scientific issues at the heart of the Sino-American relationship. And what’s for sure is that there will be “a further fraying of ties that have reached their lowest level in decades.”
There is little doubt, too, that with the U.S. presidential election, and Trump seeking re-election, only six months away; in the midst of an economic slump that has already wiped out more than 10 million jobs; with ever-escalating fatalities and widespread and all-too-visible confusion and policy flip-flops being the order of the day; and with public opinion polls showing Trump’s putative electoral rival, former Vice President Joe Biden, ahead of him, one can well understand Trump’s anger and angst – and need for convenient scapegoats to blame the mayhem on.
However, to return to the mainstream of this narrative, let me point out a couple of straws in the wind suggesting the possibility – it is no more than that, at this stage – that Modi’s India may choose to side with Trump’s America, casting aside its hitherto punctilious stand not to blame China for “creating’ the pandemic, as Bhaskar termed it.
Aside from the multiple accounts quoted above from the Indian media urging New Delhi to adopt a much tougher line against Beijing, what I find most intriguing is that this anti-China groundswell comes in the wake of Trump’s wild accusations and actions against China. Is it only a coincidence, or a fluke, that Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s much-hyped call for a comprehensive probe into the genesis of the pandemic is similarly so timed?
If the above quoted India Today TV channel’s report about the Indian national security agency initiating such an examination – surely propelled by Modi’s directive – is accurate, that, too, points in the same direction.
To be sure, we will know soon enough for certain which way Modi India’s chooses to swing: towards Trump or to stay put with the uneasy status quo. Either way the cat jumps, the decision will have not only regional, but global and strategic, ramifications.
Wait, Watch, Analyse:That is precisely why the crisis-strapped K.P. Sharma Oli government requires to urgently collect all relevant and timely intelligence on the subject from Nepali Embassies in New Delhi, Washington and Beijing. That aside, our foreign policy sages in the private sector need to closely monitor the evolving situation and, putting their collective heads together, to identify the likely consequences for Kathmandu, short and long-term, of India’s eventual choice.
My own modest policy recommendation is that we should maintain a judicious but aloof and carefully crafted policy of wait, watch, and analyse; certainly not leaping in to take sides! We have enough problems on our plate; let’s not add to them.
5 April, 2020.
# Text courtesy: Geopolitically Speaking by M. R. Josse. Publisher-Periwinkle Prakashan Pvt. Ltd. Dilli Bazar Kathmandu, Nepal.
Published : September 2020:
Thanks the publisher and the author of the book: Ed. Upadhyaya.