-By Tone Bleie
Professor
Norway’s Arctic University
The ongoing Nordic pitched NATO expansion – introductory observations
These days most editor-led public and private media broadcast Turkey’s acceptance of
Swedish membership in uncomfortably euphoric terms. I leave out the Ukrainian membership issue in this short op-ed. Quite some colleagues of mine from the Asian region send me congratulatory messages, characterizing the completed Vilnius meeting the capital of Lithuania – as heralding an era of a Nordic NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) pivot commanding political, diplomatic, and military capabilities to stand up against a resurgent Russia. Such lofty expectations might however be a gross underestimation of the challenges the Nordics as sovereign countries and NATO-members will have to tackle, granted this expansive military alliance prevails in the medium term. The presence in Vilnius of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea is a notable expression of NATO’s current expansionist Indo-Pacific policy. Will Nordic citizens 15-years on recognize the Nordic military pivot became a stabilizing force? Or let us say a generation ahead? Our children and grandchildren will have to bear the consequences as citizens and civilian and military leaders. Granted they live, not merely in in the aftermaths of another major war, or less devastatingly so, under an uneasy military deterrent-fixated Nordic “peace.” We must not forget to imagine a third truly optimistic post-2050 scenario – devoid of confrontational blocks and military superpowers.
Arguably, the emerging Nordic NATO-pivot does not necessarily hugely reduce risks of
instability, even another major war. There are political (not just geopolitical), military and environmental reasons for being cautious. Caution is warranted granted about whether this emerging pivot will notably contribute to a new Nordic peace and solidify a fragile norm- based order. Both these terms are currently cannibalized by a nearly hegemonic framing of “security” in public life. Security’s counterterrorism and surveillance-dominated framing legitimizes not merely a worrisome conditional adherence to human rights obligations, but privileges deterrence at the expense of reassurance and a European “security” (here the current orthodoxy shows) architecture. Consequently, NATO deepens the military engagement in Ukraine instead of a calling for a negotiated truce which could hinder a dangerous humiliation and counteract a rising influence in Russia of nationalist hardliners.
An op-ed of mine published on 23.06.2022 C.E. in this newspaper was titled The Nordic pivot: a stronghold for regional and global peace? Several current and coming risks were outlined, ranging from crowding and accidents due to denser civil and military traffic in the air and seas in the Baltic, in Norwegian-ruled Svalbard and the Barents region. I refrain from repeating those arguments and proceed to discuss reasons for caution about concessions and rewards for Sweden, EU and NATO-allies including Turkey, NATO’s enfant terrible.
Known and less known deal rewards:
Given details currently available as to why Erdogan gave green light in Vilnius, major rewards include: Sweden is committed to support Turkey’s restated interest in EU-membership. This is “a hairy” longer term goal for sure. Turkey approves of Sweden’s homework in amending its counterterrorism legislation. This not uncontroversial legislation, confer details below.
Furthermore, the deal details NATO’s commitment to establish a coordinator post with a counterterrorism designation. What also appears to have softened Turkey on the sidelines, is American signals that a halted sale of F-16 fighter planes will be approved. This is a concession since Biden earlier stated any decision of such a Congress-approved transfer would also depend on Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s alliance application. Turkey requested as early as in 2021 a purchase of F-16 fighters (then at a price of 20 billion USD) from Lockheed Martin Corporation and some 80 modernization kits for its existing war planes. Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor was present in Vilnius. He said officially that Biden would “move on with the transfer but declined to offer any timeline. It is also known that Secretary of State Antony Blinken had talks with the Turkish Foreign Minister Haken Fidan before the summit in Lithuania. That does not mean all stumbling blocks are removed. NATO-member and Turkey’s foe Greece wants to modernize its fleet by buying F-35 jets from the US. Also, other NATO-member states seem also to have provided carrots for Turkey before the summit. An indirect outcome in a largely government-friendly Turkish press is a projection of the deal as a major diplomatic victory for Erdogan that resets the course of Turkey-EU relations.
Dealing with an increasingly illiberal Turkey:
Greater clarity is required about what the Vilnius forged deal implies for Turkey’s eventual EU-membership, Swedish norm-based legislation in compliance with EU directives and the European and global human rights standards.
Turkey has, with some justification, been perceived as L’enfant terrible within both the EU- system and the Alliance. Recep Tayyip Erdogan is reviving and rebuilding a neo-Ottoman- inspired style and standing. He draws not the least on the secessionist Kurdish question and the Ukraine war. Also, the EU-Turkey refugee containment deal of 2016 and Turkey’s planned purchase of fighter planes and drone-export represent major political capital. Erdogan is fascinatingly agile and pragmatic. Ruthless, he makes the most of his political stamina, the Ottoman legacy, and the country’s geopolitical bridge (strait) position. All enable recent leverages. Erdogan never put all eggs in one basket, be it NATO, EU (should full membership eventually become a reality) or a recent alignment with Russia. The latter includes a blooming trade since Turkey does not support the Trans-Atlantic sanction regime. Remember this alignment is forged despite Russia is a foe in the Syrian conflict and Ukraine employs Turkish produced drones against Russian assets.
Turkey under Erdogan pursues a pragmatic foreign and defense policy, somewhat like Nepal’s most competent former heads of state chose under a non-alignment flag. Never mind Norway, another small state, which since the 1990s built down its own national total defense and relied disproportionally on a US-led NATO and a secretive bilateral US-Norway defense agreement. The result is a reduced balancing of both deterrence and reassurance. This shift began under the previous Solberg-led government (2013-2021) – in other terms before Russia annexed Crimea. In Eastern Finnmark bordering Russia, military infrastructure is currently modernized, Norwegian troop capabilities expanded in tandem with upgraded regular Arctic NATO- xercises.
The outcome of the May elections, judging our political commentators, was somewhat surprising. The election result exposes that Turkey has traits of a Eurasian autocracy and an illiberal European democracy. Autocratic traits are discernable in Erdogan’s approach to electoral power and his ability to influence the election outcome long before votes were cast. His toolbox during the campaign season included arrest of key opposition leaders and civil society activists, apart from demonization of opposition parties as too Western, coup plotters or terrorist allies. Erdogan played the homophobic card. Does it seem somewhat Putin-like? Yes, in some respects. By “objective” measures of recent under-performance, Erdogan should have lost the May election. He did not but is acutely aware he must deliver macro-economic growth with welfare dividends and curb a disastrously escalating inflation, and high youth unemployment rates. The coupling of Swedish membership with resuming negotiation for an EU-membership has surprised observers given political statements that the two are entirely different agendas. It reveals Erdogan’s leverage and urgency of economic recovery. Direct foreign investment, trade deals, and remittances (visa-free mobility within the EU) promise to revitalize the economy. But certain sub-sectors of the economy thrive.
Turkey has become an important international exporter of low-cost drones. Moskva, the flagship of Moscow’s Black Sea fleet was hit by Ukraine’s own Neptune missiles, coordinated by Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned drones. Bayraktar’s usefulness against Russian warships and forces has elevated Ankara’s standing inside NATO. Turkish produced drones have been employed in conflicts not just in the Caucasus, but in Africa and the Middle East. Ankara is extending its geopolitical influence, positioning itself to shape the outcomes of
important regional conflicts. Drone diplomacy may have certain drawbacks. Turkey’s military involvement in countries like Libya has spurred rivals. Greece, another NATO- member, and Egypt have aligned forces to constrain Turkish influence.
Possible consequences for political and civil rights:
Bound by European Union (EU) legislation in the area of terrorism, in particular, EU Directive on Combating Terrorism, Sweden already in September 2018 adopted national legislation transposing the EU-directive. To make concessions to Turkish demands, Sweden made on June 1, 2023, an amendment to Sweden’s Terrorist Crime Act (Terroristbrottslag (SFS 2022:666). The amendment creates new crimes related to terrorist organizations. It specifically criminalizes belonging to or aiding a terrorist group, financing the participation of another person’s membership in a terrorist group, publicly promoting, and recruiting members to a terrorist organization, traveling abroad to become a member of a terrorist group, and attempting to commit such crimes.
Specifically, section 4a of the Terrorist Crimes Act now provides as follows:
Anyone who participates in the activities of a terrorist organization in a way that is intended to promote, strengthen or support the organization is to be convicted of [the crime of] participating in a terrorist organization.
The penalty is imprisonment for a maximum of four years. The amendment was adopted following a proposal by the Swedish government and recommendation by the Standing Committee on Justice. The legislation got wide support in the eight-party parliament. Only members from the Greens and Left Party voted against, 268 members voted in favor of the amendments, 34 against and 47 were absent. But this wide-ranging law might risk criminalizing ordinary political activity on Swedish and foreign soil and resembles provisions in counterterrorism legislation of authoritarian regimes the Nordic governments have not wanted to be associated with. Here a caveat is required. NATO-led America’s own anti-terrorism legislation is sweeping. We should note that certain provisions in this recent amendment were not advised by The Council on Legislation. The Council was skeptical about the amendment. It explained that criminalizing membership in a terrorist organization “cannot exceed what is necessary in consideration of the purpose that has given rise to it and also not extend so far that it constitutes a threat to the free formation of opinion as one of the fundamentals of democracy (compare 2 ch. 21 §).
The reason why I go into pains of referring to the recent amendment in detail is that Sweden likes to project itself, as its neighbors, as a prime champion for a rule-based order including the international human rights regime as enshrined in its Constitution and other laws. Since Sweden applied for membership in May 2022, the Turkish Government has demanded terrorist-listed political cadres from The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PPK) and People’s Defense Units (YPG) be extradited. Moreover, the Council of Europe dedicated for years much effort to ensure that Turkey complied with European and Global standards. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg e.g., ruled that the businessman, activist, and philanthropist Osma Kavala life sentence was politically motivated. He is one of several high-profiled political convicts still imprisoned.
Erdogan, this astute and ruthless head of state and unpredictable NATO-member has successfully used leverage to demand expanded counterterrorism legislation in EU and Sweden as a member country and aspiring alliance member. This is concerning news for European human rights institutions, including European courts, civil society watchdogs and indeed supporters of parties and outfits which rightly or wrongly face prosecution under terrorism laws.
Remember the constitutional change which took effect in July 2018. Erdogan became simultaneously the head of state, of government, of the ruling party, the police as a national force, and the military as commander in chief, just as Putin has assumed sweeping executive powers in Russia. The sweeping presidential powers of the US president are less recent. The catch phrase new Sultan is somewhat fitting as Erdogan has embraced the vestiges of an imperial head of state – currently residing in Bestepe, a massive 1,200-room palace and office campus in Ankara.
One a concluding note, political commentators and concerned citizens should vigorously debate and examine what “strong” Nordic Nato-pivot entails in the current jargon of our political and military leaders, strategists, and lawmakers. And further, how jargon and less visible problematic assumptions translate into recent and proposed counterterrorism and related “security” framed legislation on government surveillance and political oversight. The “devil is in the detail” one might say.
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# More about the author: Tone Bleie is Professor of Public Policy and Cultural Understanding at UiT, Norway’s Arctic University. Bleie work as development executive, researcher, trainer and consultant in and on Bangladesh, Nepal, the Greater Himalayas, the Tibetan Plateau spans over four decades. Bleie served as Chief in UN Escap, as Director for the Centre for Peace Studies UiT, Expert Board Member of ICIMOD and of The Norwegian Government’s Commission on International Security. She can be reached at tone.bleie@uit.no
-The challenge: balancing norm defense with a military and defense pivot position
Is this the better way to conclude or should I rather give importance to other issues??