-Zafar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, Islamabad, Pakistan
This section focuses on the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenals. The study argues that the right of peaceful uses of nuclear technology should not be hampered by concerns about nuclear security. Pakistan has instituted a comprehensive and stringent but home-grown mechanism to ensure safety and security of its nuclear weapons, facilities and personnel. In parallel, it closely follows international standards and fulfills global commitments. Pakistan is implementing its National Security Action Plan (NSAP) and has institutionalized a robust command and control system.
Pakistan had established the National Command Authority (NCA) in 1999 and later its secretariat known as the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). The NCA has improved its functions and competencies for employment and deployment of the forces over time in a transparent and effective manner in order to build a robust communication and coordination mechanism. Pakistan believes that transparency measures, rational behaviour, international engagements and a strong democratic policy process are in its best interest.
The SPD has a dedicated branch working on arms control and disarmament issues that interacts with national and global institutions and bodies to articulate Pakistan‘s perspective and also benefit from international best practices.
The SPD has initiated a Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) by knitting together a cluster of agencies to monitor experts handling sensitive materials and information to avoid any risks of critical information leakage. A multi-layered system of security has been introduced for physical protection of nuclear weapons, infrastructure and installations. The Pakistan Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS), based on national and international best practices and standards, was established in 2012. The PCENS imparts training in the entire range of activities, directly or indirectly linked with nuclear safety and nuclear security. The Director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, during his recent visit to this Centre remarked, ―It is very impressive that [Pakistan organizes] the training in a very systemic and operational manner.
In addition to this, Pakistan adhered to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in October 2000, to ensure safe domestic transportation of nuclear weapons and materials and is currently considering acceding to the 2005 amendment to CPPNM after its inter-agency process is completed. In addition, Pakistan passed the widely acknowledged Export Control Act in 2004 to strengthen and regulate controls over the exports, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of goods and technologies related to nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons. The Act led to the creation of a Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to formulate and enforce rules and regulations for the implementation of export controls in accordance with the above mentioned act. Pakistan has introduced a national action plan (NAP) on export controls and the safety and security of nuclear facilities and material.
The PNRA, an independent body, is committed to safeguarding and regulating nuclear facilities and safety to eliminate any possibility of insider/outsider threat to the nuclear and radiation facilities in the country.
The PNRA, in tandem with the SPD, also ensures the security of the facilities against external threats.
Thus, there is a synergy between nuclear safety and nuclear security in Pakistani system.
Pakistan is a member in the IAEA, the IAEA Code of Conduct, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Container
Security Initiative, and IAEA‘s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).
Pakistan realizes that transparency measures, rational behaviour and a strong democratic process are in its best interest. This change is very significant and Pakistan is engaging with the international community to learn from their best practices and experiences through its proactive participation in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). Pakistan has outlined five pillars of its nuclear security regime at the NSS at The Hague: comprehensive command and control structure under the NCA; intelligence and surveillance systems; an autonomous regulatory system; a rigorous/stringent domestic export control regime; and proactive cooperative arrangements with the international community.
Pakistan‘s nuclear security arrangements have been widely acclaimed at the global level. The above arrangements and efforts by Pakistan discount the possibility of any theft of nuclear materials. The US Department of Defence has recently expressed its confidence in the security of nuclear weapons and related materials in Pakistan. In a message to Pakistani leading newspaper it said, ―Pakistan has a professional and dedicated security force that understands the importance of nuclear
security.
The then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had stated, [Pakistan‘s] nuclear assets are in safe hands and that Pakistan‘s command and control system is invincible. Pakistan‘s then Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif, during a recent visit to the Centre of Excellence, said ―Pakistan has taken measures, including setting up of the PCENS, to strengthen its nuclear security. He also reiterated, ―Nuclear security is a sacred responsibility‖ and lauded the progress the institution has made after its establishment. Like other nuclear weapons states, Pakistan also recognizes the need to safeguard its strategic assets and related materials in its larger national interest. This is why Pakistan is managing its effective custodial control against theft, sabotage, mishaps, and accidents.
Mainstreaming Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order:
Now the question arises: what is normalization and mainstreaming? We believe that Pakistan is already a normal and responsible nuclear weapons state. Mainstreaming means: giving Pakistan its due recognition as a nuclear weapons state. Entry into the NSG alone, however, would not mainstream Pakistan, without an explicit or implicit recognition of Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state by the NPT member states. Pakistan has been actively pursuing norms and principles that are consistent with the non-proliferation regime and this should establish Pakistan as a responsible nuclear power. It fully understands the international nuclear order and is ready to cooperate and contribute towards it without compromising on its core national interest. It is high time that the international community recognize Pakistan as a responsible nuclear weapons state in the evolving global nuclear order based on mutual trust and respect, transparency and dignity. We make the following five proposals that may help mainstream Pakistan in the international system and assist the international community to understand Pakistan‘s acute security concerns, its strides towards normative frameworks and its strong qualifications as a responsible nuclear weapons state.
Normalizing the global nuclear order by making it consistent with emerging realities:
First, we believe that there is an urgent need to envisage a new consensus on disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation under the UN Charter, and in accordance with the principle of ―equal security for all.‖97 This may not be politically viable for some states, but we should not overlook that if the nonproliferation regime secures broader legal legitimacy and uniform criteria binds all states, then this will diminish the possibilities of violation of norms within the regime, too.
Second, it is necessary to normalize the non-proliferation regime to advance its goals based on the NPT‘s three pillars ─ non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The NPT sets the central objective of universal and comprehensive disarmament instead of legitimizing the continued possession and multiplication of nuclear stockpiles by a few states. There is also a need for making progress on NSAs. The Conference on Disarmament should vigorously pursue this issue, which is already on its agenda.
Third, efforts should continue to be made to ensure the safety and security of nuclear weapons and the related materials, technologies and facilities worldwide. The nuclear deal with Iran is a big breakthrough and it would have a far-reaching and salutary impact on the non-proliferation regime and regional stability. In a similar manner, the six-party talks can address the North Korean issue.
Fourth, a new broad formula needs to be defined for export control policies that can meet current and future demands. The non-NPT states have a distinct legal persona based on their own security paradigms and imperatives influenced by globalization, the rise in energy demand, information revolution and changing security environment. Efforts should, therefore, be made to create an effective and enduring ―criteria-based approach‖ for these states to join the NSG. An additional benefit would be that Pakistan, in its own interest, would continue to respect global non-proliferation norms. The right of peaceful uses of nuclear technology should not be subject to the question of nonproliferation after taking into consideration states’ serious nonproliferation commitments and justifiable energy demands. For Pakistan, it is a time-sensitive strategic imperative to reduce power deficiency that plagues its economic development and affects human security. Thus, inclusion of Pakistan in the NSG to preserve its right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology should strengthen, not weaken, the nuclear order.
Once cooperation is strengthened through such inclusion, trust between Pakistan and the NSG members would grow and as a result uncertainty and fear would decrease.
The implementation of this proposal may enable the world to establish and reinforce agreed norms against non-proliferation, promote peace, rule out the dreaded possibility of use of nuclear weapons and realize the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Regulating India’s modernization by addressing the growing conventional force asymmetry
India is qualitatively and quantitatively increasing its nuclear stockpiles and modernizing conventional capabilities, and this would certainly increase insecurity of all the states around India and beyond the region.
Considering South Asia‘s conflict-driven past, the widening gap in conventional forces and the arrival of nuclear weapons and development of thermonuclear weapons, the great powers can play a crucial role in discouraging states from taking sides and supporting one at the expense of the other. Discriminatory treatment of Pakistan has left it vulnerable to India. This has stepped up arms race in the region and weakened deterrence stability. India, with a greater conventional force capability, may threaten the territorial integrity of the weaker side. The conventionally weaker side, Pakistan, is left with two options for survival. One, it can follow a catalytic doctrinal posture ─ that is, to seek the intercession of a third party which could intervene just before a crisis seems to be spinning out of control. Two, it can adopt an asymmetric escalation posture ─ that is, to rely on the first use of nuclear weapons, to offset the mightier conventional side of the adversary.
Arguably, there is a greater shift of major power from Europe to Asia-Pacific as Asia turns to become a strategic and economic hub in the 21st century, which offers new avenues to these two rival states ─ Pakistan and India. The US with its alliances in the Asia Pacific region may continue to nudge India towards resumption and maintenance of a sustainable dialogue process with Pakistan. Instead of creating imbalance by rewarding India with material support, armaments, naval platforms, and new delivery and surveillance means,102 the US can help construct a security regime to address the two states‘ insecurities and political complexities, particularly in terms of reducing the growing conventional force asymmetry.
Addressing the issues that hinder the arms control regime between India and Pakistan:
There is an urgent need for both India and Pakistan to realize that the nuclear weapons offer them nothing more than deterrence. At the same time, both states need to clearly establish an understanding that neither the use of total force is feasible nor total victory is possible in a nuclear war. Thus, it is imperative that these two states reengage to create a strategic restraint regime that comprises nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution. Pakistan made this proposal to India, shortly after the 1998 nuclear tests, to sustain deterrence stability, avoid the danger of nuclear use and avert a costly and mutually destructive war.
The creation of an arms control framework between India and Pakistan may not be possible for certain reasons. First, both India and Pakistan are at an early stage of their nuclear weapons development. Until they are out of initial stages of nuclear development, which may include assured second-strike capability, sophisticated delivery systems, and maturation of the security and safety infrastructure, efforts to develop such a framework would have little significance.
Second, there is a growing conventional disparity between India and Pakistan, which makes it imperative for Pakistan to sustain a higher level of deterrent capability. Both sides may require some level of deterrent force symmetry before they conclude an arms control discussion. The South Asian region must pass through critical learning stages, as the United States and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War period, though the strategic environment and situation between the two South Asian rivals is different and the Cold War nuclear strategies may not necessarily be applicable in the South Asia.
Third, states’ war-like doctrinal postures have strategic implications. Despite the understanding that too much openness could undermine the credibility of a state‘s deterrent, particularly when it is conventionally vulnerable and geographically smaller than its rival, there is still a need for some transparency in nuclear policies, which in turn could help build a stronger framework for arms control processes. Ironically, Pakistan has been drawn into the South Asian arms race because of Indian doctrinal and force posture. The dramatic shifts in both the strategic and conventional deterrent forces of one side would thus have implications for the other, which keeps the clock of a new arms race ticking. As a result, this puts greater pressure on South Asian deterrence stability.
The prospects for an arms control regime (ACR) in South Asia are bleak and it may not be possible to create such a regime in the immediate future because of the complex issues explained. But some potential exists for an arms control process, which would require a combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral endeavors to pave the way for a peaceful strategic environment.
# Text courtesy: Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order, Islamabad Papers series No. 1. 2016.
# concluding part to begin with “Reconsidering strategic dilemma.