Continued from the previous issue-
By Zafar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, Islamabad, Pakistan
Islamabad realizes that the existence of the non-proliferation regime is important for the prevention of further spread of nuclear weapons and their related materials for military purposes, but it also understands that Pakistan may not become part of the NPT and the CTBT or join lopsided negotiations on the FMCT that, at the moment, tend to be flawed, discriminatory and inconsistent. However, it continues to adhere to the highest standards of non-proliferation and the normative framework for nuclear restraint and responsibility, without compromising on its core national interests. The following section elaborates the issues associated with the non-proliferation regime.
Why does Pakistan not join the NPT?
Pakistan has believed in a cooperation-based policy from the outset. For example, Pakistan joined the IAEA in 1957 and later fully supported the NPT negotiations. Pakistan did not sign the NPT because it has serious reservations about the current structure of this treaty.
First, even a cursory study of the NPT Articles I, IV and VI reveals five countries are recognized as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS also known as P-5) while the rest of the treaty‘s signatories are regarded as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). As a logical corollary, these NNWS are barred from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such discrimination has led to arguments that the NPT is primarily focused on safeguarding the interests of the P-5 states. This ―special arrangement legitimizes the continuous possession of nuclear weapons by only five NWS and demands non-acquisition by other non-nuclear state parties, without the quid pro quo of substantial disarmament by NNWS.
Second, no significant progress has been made to implement article VI of the NPT prescribing disarmament by the NWS. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 referred to the article VI of the NPT obligates the NWS to make efforts in good faith to achieve global disarmament. The NPT has made no progress towards disarmament, which has thus perpetuated the status quo and a crisis of trust.
Third, the multilateral negotiations on nuclear export controls to oversee trade of the dual use technologies and determine their end usage led to the creation of the NSG—an arrangement, which was made in response to the Indian nuclear explosions in 1974. For its part, the NSG holds no legal legitimacy or a formal structure when we compare it with the institutional basis of the IAEA.
Fourth, there is a problem with the non-universal status of the NPT and its inability to remain sustainable. From the outset, states adhered, to a greater or lesser extent, to the terms of the NPT, but India, Israel (practicing nuclear opacity) and Pakistan have never joined the NPT. North Korea withdrew in 2003 challenging the provisions of the NPT. In future, any country that would acquire nuclear weapons would be from within the NPT. There are two ways that a state would go nuclear: one, it could begin a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme; and two, it could withdraw from the NPT by asserting that it confronts an extraordinary threat jeopardizing the supreme interest and security of the country.
Fifth, existence of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons programme is rooted deep in its security compulsions. The Indian testing of nuclear devices in 1998 changed the politico-strategic canvas of the region —reducing Pakistan‘s options to remain a covert nuclear state —and forcing Pakistan to test its nuclear weapons capability.
In 1974, Pakistan had proposed to establish a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia; and in 1978 it proposed to India a series of measures which it rejected. These included a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons, mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities, simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, and simultaneous acceptance of IAEA‘s full-scope safeguards.
All these factors, when cumulatively evaluated, indicate how Pakistan faced a security conundrum and how it was forced to shift from the normative to a strategic pathway. Pakistan‘s policy in pursuit of a NWFZ in South Asia became redundant when the regional security architecture changed in 1998.
The declared status of the two states has a substantive impact on the non-proliferation regime and global politics. The fact that Pakistan went nuclear and is not a party to the NPT does not mean at all that it is opposed to the global non-proliferation norms. Empirical record shows clearly that it respected global non-proliferation norms at all the international forums and continues to promote these norms.
Difficulties associated with the FMCT and the CTBT:
The recent Carnegie-Stimson report suggests that Pakistan should remove its ―veto on the negotiations in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which Pakistan prefers to call a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) in order to include existing stocks in its scope, and sign unilaterally the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Doing this, the report suggests, would mainstream Pakistan in the so-called global nuclear order to ultimately secure a membership in the NSG and that this will put pressure on India to join the FMCT negotiations and sign the CTBT.
Pakistan has a principled diplomatic stance on the FMCT. Pakistan insists that negotiations on all four items agreed to in the Shannon Mandate of 1995 Nuclear Disarmament, a FMT, Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) ─ be pursued simultaneously. The FMCT is a proposed treaty and may not be enforced unless security concerns of all state parties are amicably addressed and mutually agreed upon, because states would always take decisions on joining a treaty on the basis of perceived costs and benefits.
For Islamabad, many factors deepen the impasse of the FMCT negotiations. One, the FMCT needs to be a non- discriminatory and universally verifiable treaty. Pakistan has repeatedly said in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that ―a ban on the production of fissile material should be promoted through a universal non-discriminatory treaty in the CD and through universal measures. Two, Pakistan does not agree with the term ―cut-of as it does not cover the existing stocks of fissile material. Three, the FMCT should be conceived as a genuine disarmament measure, not devoted merely to the goals of non-proliferation. Four, non-inclusion of ―existing stockpiles‖ of fissile materials puts Pakistan in a disadvantageous position vizà-viz its adversary, India. Pakistan has also called for eliminating asymmetries in existing stockpiles of fissile materials. In 2006, Pakistan stated, ―[a] cut-off in the manufacturing of fissile materials must be accompanied by a mandatory programme for the elimination of asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states …a fissile material treaty must provide a schedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use and placing these stockpiles under the Safeguards.
Five, Pakistan believes that the US-India nuclear deal and the NSG‘s special waiver to India have unquestionably given India an advantage by facilitating expansion of its existing stockpiles of fissile materials, which in turn would enable India to increase its strategic forces.
Also, these two things combined would undermine Pakistan‘s deterrence credibility.78 Given its ambition to acquire hundreds of nuclear warheads, India faces the dilemma to build its arsenal while meeting its civilian nuclear goals. India has resolved this problem by leveraging the deal with the United States. Finally, Pakistan has concerns that the changed South Asian strategic environment created by the US-India nuclear deal, NSG special waiver to India and India‘s nuclear and conventional build-up imperils regional stability.
Regarding the CTBT, Pakistan has already declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. For some in Pakistan, the CTBT is a stagnating treaty, which still needs to be ratified by at least eight countries including the US and China (NPT nuclear weapons states). India has never been a part of the NPT nor has it has any intention of signing the CTBT. Since Pakistan has longstanding security concerns viz-à-viz India, and its nuclear weapons are India-specific, it would not consider signing the NPT or the CTBT unilaterally unless India does it first.
Pakistan‘s unilateral move to sign the CTBT is not likely to impress India or put greater strategic pressure on it to follow suit, as the recent Carnegie-Stimson report suggests. Despite not being part of the CTBT, Pakistan has already conformed voluntarily to its core purpose by not conducting more nuclear weapons tests. For more than a decade and a half, Pakistan has not carried nuclear weapons tests. However, if India tests again, Pakistan could revisit its conditional moratorium. Pakistan does not see any logic in signing a treaty that has not yet been enforced. The future prospects for the CTBT‘s success are directly linked to the decisions of major nuclear weapons states and their approaches towards the non-proliferation regime.
There are many reasons for Pakistan not taking a unilateral approach to signing the CTBT as it would not meet Pakistan‘s security interests. One, it is unclear whether India would follow suit at all, given its intention to build hydrogen bombs and its desire for power projection beyond South Asia. Two, Pakistan will not be recognized as a nuclear weapons state by the NPT member states even if it signs the treaty. Three, Pakistan may not secure substantial support for its peaceful nuclear programme unlike India, which has already gained special NSG waiver despite being a non-signatory to both the NPT and the CTBT.
Four, it is not clear whether this will help ―mainstream Pakistan.
Finally, unilaterally joining the CTBT does not serve Pakistan‘s interests especially when India could possibly go for more tests.
Joining and then quitting the CTBT because of India‘s nuclear weapons tests, as the Carnegie-Stimson report suggests, would also not suit Pakistan. If, hypothetically speaking, Pakistan were to join and quit because of India‘s possible tests, such a reversal would have a hugely negative and costly impact as strategic pressure would be mounted on Islamabad to either comply with the regime or be ready for punitive sanctions. Possibly, Islamabad could become a part of a multilateral approach (along with 43 other states mentioned in the Annex II), in reaffirming unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.
While not joining the NPT and the CTBT or the FMCT negotiations for obvious reasons, Pakistan is conducting itself as a responsible nuclear weapons. It participates in and contributes to the work of various international forums to join efforts to promote non-proliferation and nuclear safety and security. This unilateral conformity of Pakistan with nuclear normalcy and responsibility necessitates an appropriate strategy by the international community to remove restrictions on Pakistan to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Challenges of adherence to the NSG and emerging demands:
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member states clearly laid down the admission criteria of new states in 2001 Aspen Plenary: the new aspirant states should be party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agree to enforce full-scope safeguards with the IAEA. The NPT‘s membership condition for states‘ adherence to the NSG was removed in its guidelines in 2012. Obviously, India, a non-NPT nuclear weapons state, has not placed its eight reactors under the IAEA full-scope safeguards and, thus, it is not entitled to the NSG membership.
The NSG rules forbid nuclear cooperation with states that have unsafeguarded facilities.
India has not signed the CTBT, nor does it really support the FMCT negotiations. There is also a serious question mark on India‘s adherence to the Additional Protocol. Within the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol on sharing the activities and facilities with the IAEA, India only agreed to submit information on nuclear-related exports. India does not report information on nuclear fuel-cycle-related research and development, nuclear-related imports, and uranium mining. Considering its ambitions to build a secret nuclear city to expand and modernize its programme, operationalize a triad and induct long-range missiles, India pursues undeclared nuclear activities outside of safeguards. India has been offered full space by the US and other NSG members to divert its nuclear material to finalize not only its sea-based triad, but also a huge clandestine HEU project in Karnataka.
On the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in pursuance of the NPT‘s Article IV, the NSG should not oppose development of peaceful nuclear energy, even as it remains strongly opposed to proliferation. The NSG lacks legal legitimacy and an institutional mechanism to address energy demands of the states on the basis of a given criteria. The NSG has to recognize current realities. In time, the NSG will have to reflect emerging trends in the global nuclear power industry. Considering its domestic power starvation and deficiency that plagues its development and endangers human security, Pakistan too aspires to secure membership in the NSG but guided by a ―criteria based approach, which defines nuclear cooperation with new nuclear weapons states based on equality and justice, which is consistent with current political realities. Such a pragmatic proposition is paramount for Pakistan, as it has already started work on the Karachi nuclear power plants II and III to generate 8,800 MW of electricity by 2030 and 40,000 MW by 2050 to make up for its power deficiency. Pakistan has planned to build more nuclear power plants to add electricity to its national grid to ensure energy security and accelerate the pace of economic development; and is confident that it can accomplish this task by promoting nuclear security norms and implementing its national energy plans, under relevant international safeguards.
# More to follow.
Text courtesy: Pakistan in the Global Nuclear Order, Islamabad Papers-2016, nuclear paper series No. 1