-The Limits of Power of a Small State-Part I 

SRIDHAR K. KHATRI, Ambassador designate USA

Debates on foreign policy issues in Nepal are rare; and when they take place, they remain limited to perfunctory academic exercises which alter very little the decision makers’ perspectives in the way policies are eventually executed.

This is so because the encounters usually turn into a dialogue of the deaf as the opinion of one group matters very little to another.

The official position of the government — backed by its armory of supporters from the bureaucracy, the official media, and now the party followers — has little to offer in the way of new ideas and is usually taken for granted while works by writers on the subject, when of some value, are often geared toward titillating the audiences with provocative data and pet theories, rather than having prescriptive value for policy consideration.

This is not to say that the intellectual community in Nepal is always at loggerheads with the establishment.

Often, the intelligentsia in the country have been coopted into the system, thereby effectively emasculating a healthy debate.

During the Panchayat period, when issues relating to Nepal’s foreign policy were considered to be almost exclusively within the purview of the Palace, debates on sensitive matters were rare; and when these did take place, the discussion geared, in one way or the other, toward mobilizing support for the official position.

Rarer still were criticisms of the official line, as the near messianic zeal of those especially close to the establishment was enough to drown out the views of others.

This tradition has been maintained even after the reintroduction of multiparty system in the country in 1990. Despite drastic changes in the global and domestic environment, no substantial discussion of Nepal’s foreign policy has taken place, except for a number of seminars on Nepal India relations.

Even during such pre-ordained gatherings, those interested in a more detached and objective review of the state of bilateral relations between the two neighbors have usually been marginalized in the debates by those clinging to the official (party) lines from Nepal and India, thereby effectively drowning the voices of those not in conformity with the stilted approach.

This paper does not attempt to address all these shortcomings, since a more detailed discussion on the topic is required. It does, however, deal with the central question of Nepal’s role in the international environment and its implications for the country in the years ahead.

For the purpose of analysis, the paper has been divided into two parts.

The first part contains a theoretical discussion on the role of small powers, like Nepal, in the international system, and examines the options that are open to such a country in a given environment.

The second part of the paper briefly reviews how Nepal has coped historically with the various international systems and examines some of the salient issues which have a bearing on the country today.

The significance of international and regional bodies, such as the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), for Nepal’s foreign policy is also briefly touched upon in the process.

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It may not be off the mark to say here that among the public today there is little appreciation of Nepal’s position in the international system.

Whatever discussion does take place on the subject usually falls into three broad categories.

The “globalists” tend to maximize the power position of the country and often paint a national image that is beyond the country’s existing capabilities. Official media have for a long time played on this aspect, and in the process developed a romantic picture of statecraft which even policymakers find it hard to identify with.

Second, as the name suggests, the adherents of the Indo-centric approach view Nepal’s international position as totally revolving around India. Guided by the notion that India can do no wrong toward Nepal, advocates of this school of thought, while failing to question India’s motives, see compliance to Indian policies as not totally in congruent with the national interest. And, third, the “isolationists” tend to minimize whatever little contribution Nepal can offer to, or benefits it can obtain from, the international arena.

Partly out of ignorance, and partly due to cynicism as a result of marginalization of smaller countries in the international system, this group tends to view the country as an object of international machination, rather than an actor in the process.

Although there is some logic in the stand taken by each of the above groups, they are united in their inability to base their assessment upon a real appreciation of power.

Power is, however, an amorphous concept that is neither measurable nor quantifiable, but has to be judged on the ability of individual actors to influence the actions and behavior of others. Being weak, smaller powers have less of a chance in conditioning the responses of other nations, particularly since international systems are shaped by great powers who have sought to ensure the systems’ survival as they reflect the stronger powers’ values and capabilities.

On the other hand, weakness is not usually tantamount to impotence, since small countries, including the poorer ones, “not only have better or worse choices in different international systems but also can take advantage of their opportunities in a better or worse fashion.”

David Vital calls these invisible assets. “contingent resources,” which he defines as “the situational and interim advantages of a state that often play a decisive role in influencing the outcome of conflicts.”

There is no single definition of what actually constitutes small powers in international politics, although they share many common features among them.

In the growing literature on the subject, some writers have argued about the inadequacy of the concept of small states as an analytical tool and have recommended abandoning it as a focus of studies altogether, while others have called attempts to define the small state as meaningless since, like the international system, such a definition also tends to vary through time.”

On the other hand, Robert Rothstein has addressed the matter rather bluntly by contending that small powers cannot be defined by specific qualities they possess (or lack) but rather by how they are perceived by others as well as themselves.

Generally, a combination of factors has been used to define the term “small state”: first, population size and geographical location; second, the ranking scale of a state in terms of its capability; third, the relative influence exercised by these states; and, fourth, identifying characteristics through hypotheses on what differentiates small states from the other classes of states.

Although such classifications are usually less than watertight, as only.

The geographical factor tends to remain constant over a given time, the exercise, nevertheless, helps to generate a better understanding of the status of these countries at the international level.

Among the four categories, the reliance on population and geographical factors in determining the status of small powers is most controversial, because even though states may behave in terms of their capabilities as small powers, they may actually have a large geographic area and population size.

Bangladesh and Pakistan, in South Asia, are both cases in point.

Although these countries stand out perceptibly in these respective categories when compared to Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives in the region, the behavior patterns of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, with some qualifications, are quite similar to those of their smaller neighbors in terms of their dealings with India.’

On the other hand, the Maldives exemplifies another extreme position of an exceedingly small state in the group. With 0.2% of population and 0.03% of the territory of Pakistan, there are inherent dangers in lumping together these two states into the same group when one considers that the Maldivians had to first house their delegation to the UN in a stamp shop on Manhattan, whereas Pakistan aspires to a seat in a restructured Security Council, not unlike India. Nevertheless, population and territorial attributes provide a feel of the status of countries, without necessarily confusing them with indices of their capabilities.

The use of the ranking method enables various categories of small states to be identified through quantifiable elements of state capability.

Thus, it is possible to rank these powers according to their economic status by measuring their GNP; distinguish their political influence from the level of their trade, involvement in international and regional organizations, and the extent of their participation in the worldwide diplomatic network; and determine their military status according to their defense expenditure.

It is also possible for a country to fit in some of the above typology without actually behaving as a small state. For instance, the degrees of influence which Singapore can exercise in the economic field and Israel in the military arena are not evenly spread into other areas, even though according to population and size both are considered to be small.

And, similarly, the levels of development of countries can also differentiate their international behavior, since small powers in developed societies, such as Finland in Western Europe, may exercise influence in international politics which is beyond the capacity of such states in the developing world to do so.

The relative influence of small states is in large part circumvented by such factors as tradition, strategic location, degree of domestic stability, organization, and personality.

Based on a survey of a group of small states, R. P. Barston identifies a number of limitations faced by such states when attempting to translate their capability into policy. According to him, small states have only limited international involvement; remain vulnerable to external pressures as they do not have broad choices in implementing their foreign policy;

# possess limited machinery for conducting foreign policies; and are restricted in their freedom of maneuverability by their strategic location.

In particular, he notes that mini states with population of less than a million face maximum restraints as the external relations of these countries tend to be more “administrative” in character.

Maurice A. East goes even further and outlines some of the options exercised by these states in their external dealings. From his research findings, he concludes that small states

# prefer to minimize the cost of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions and by directing their attention toward joint or multiple actor targets;

#do not initiate as much verbal actions as large states;

# engage much more in conflictual nonverbal behavior, particularly in high risk areas;

# avoid ambiguity in foreign policy behavior, exhibiting more specificity as to the issues at hand and the target being influenced; and

# rely frequently more on the economic techniques of statecraft than the larger states.

As the capabilities of the small states can often be less than adequate in the security field, they must rely on the assistance of other states, institutions, processes, and developments to do so.”

In such instances, small states have the choice of either joining military alliances, placing their hopes on a collective security system, or even using their limited resources in the international fora to generate extra support.

What makes small powers truly viable actors in the international arena is their ability to exercise at propitious moments influence which is disproportionate to their accepted level of power.

Such opportunities, which may come from circumstances or systemic conditions, offer not only greater scope for maneuverability but can also be an indispensable tool for the survival of the small states during times of conflict. Studies by Annette Baker Fox on the survival capacity of the small powers during the Second World War and by others during the Cold War suggest a common pattern.

First, the physical characteristics of a country, including its geographic location, can be a source of strength at times of conflict. During the Second World War, both Switzerland and Spain were partly able to maintain their independence because of the Pyrenees, while Turkey was protected by the Transcaucasian ranges.

On the other hand, Pakistan got the most out of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War due to its strategic importance.

This bargaining position of Pakistan was enhanced considerably after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when after initially turning down an American offer of 200 million dollars, Pakistan became the conduit for over $3.2 billion of Western economic and military assistance program as a part of their anti-Soviet campaign.

Second, control of one or more scarce commodities of strategic value can also increase the bargaining power of small states.

In the midst of the War, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey were able to get major concessions from both the Axis and Allied powers by using the raw materials as a bargaining chip in their negotiations with the warring factions.

Similarly, in the 1970s, the OPEC countries, and in particular, the Arab members of the group, were able to extract not only major economic concessions, but also political concession by using oil as a leverage to change Western European and Japanese policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Third, if small states had good relations with neighbors who themselves were small or medium-sized states, it worked to their advantage, as it decreased their vulnerability and provided them with non-military support. During the War, Spain buried its historical rivalry with Greece and France, and in turn received their support during the conflict.

On the other hand, the Eastern European states were later swallowed by the Soviet Union due to their never-ending rivalry. In the mid-1960s, Rhodesia was able to evade the effects of UN sanctions primarily due to the support given by South Africa and its other friends who were not prepared to apply sanctions fully.

Fourth, the quality of small state diplomacy often determined not only how well they were treated by stronger powers, but also how much benefits they were able to extract from them.

During the War, belligerent powers showed greater respect for countries with an aura of former greatness and expected their diplomats to be more resourceful negotiators than the ones from younger countries.

Germany did not occupy Hungary until March 1944, whereas the Soviets invaded Finland in the early phase of the war in 1939.

Small states also benefited if they could draw on the services of capable negotiators who could

# convince the warring factions of their legitimate demands, without being punished by either side;

# procrastinate when necessary until the timeliness of a particular demand had disappeared and the attention of the great powers had been diverted elsewhere;

# distract the demands of the great powers by calling attention to the costliness of the desired concession;

# and trade the less critical concessions to avoid conceding more vital points.

A successful small state, such as Switzerland, was able to persuade the belligerents that it should be kept neutral, while others opted for a riskier course by exploiting divisions within the warring factions by playing off one country against the other.

During the Cold War, Nonalignment provided many newly emerging small states with a sense of diplomatic identity distinct from the two contending power blocs or other small states which had been integrated into the great power alliance network.

Although the efficacy of Nonalignment as a policy still remains a subject of debate, there is, nevertheless, general agreement that the movement allowed many states to play international roles beyond their individual capacity to do so.”

And, lastly, international and regional organizations offer small states additional room for maneuverability by providing them opportunities to maintain international contacts and generate support from like-minded and sympathetic states on matters of national concern.

As a global institution, the UN has served as the principal venue for raising, if not negotiating, issues of major concern to the developing world.

With the vast influx of new nations to the world body after 1960, the UN became the focal point for deliberating on questions relating to colonialism, racism, and economic development.

 There can be little doubt that the now famous UN resolutions on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People and the establishment of the UN Capital Development Fund (now UNDP) went a long way in changing both the political and economic structure of international politics for years to come.

Similarly, even participation by small states in loosely structured regional organizations, like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), has made it possible for the weaker states to negotiate with stronger powers more effectively.

In the case of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Indochina refugee crisis in the late 1970s, ASEAN members were able to cope effectively with the challenges through collective efforts.

On the whole, our brief survey of the literature on the subject suggests that even though small states face overwhelming odds in the international environment, there is, nevertheless, scope for maneuverability by these powers should they be up to the challenge.

As no two states are alike, and since no two stateś share the same problems to the same degree, there can be no common formula as to how individual states should tackle them.

Ultimately, however, the manner in which the small states choose to exploit the opportunities will depend no only on their capability, but also on their ability to recognize and seize them.

# Text courtesy: From the book “The Political Economy of Small States” edited by Professor Ananda Aditya and published by Nepal Foundation for Advanced Studies (NEFAS)/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Second Edition 2001.

The distinguished author of this academic article Khatri, a Professor of political science and is Ambassador designate to the United States of America.

Thanks NEFAS/FES and the eminent author Professor Sridhar K. Khatri: N. P. Upadhyaya (telegraphnepal.com).

#The second part will be published soon: ED.